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 FOREWORD
Professor Richard Harding
Law School, University of Western Australia
New South Wales has been one of the pioneers in sexual assault law
reform, not just within Australia but also internationally. It is particularly
appropriate, therefore, that this seminar should have been held to take stock of
progress and to begin charting future needs. For, as was pointed out in the
L’Orange/Egger paper, “law reform is not a ‘once and for all’ exercise. There is
a demonstrated need for continued vigilance in the monitoring of the operation
of the law.”
\
The papers canvassed two main areas—sexual abuse involving adults and
child sexual abuse. These tended to be discussed discretely, rather than as
related though distinct aspects of a single continuum. If a link did emerge it
was that of concern for the victim. The question of how best to refine further
legal procedures so as to protect victims from trauma associated with the
processes of investigation and court trials thus emerged prominently.
As so often happens in such discussions, this concern for the victim
manifested itself to some extent as anger against offenders, or putative offenders,
as a class, and dismay about the supposed shortcomings of the legal sy
stem.
Some ideas were put forward which, if adopted, would tend to distort or ero
de
the presumption of innocence. This is a trap into which feminists, particularly
but not exclusively, tend to fall in their understandable revulsion against certai
n
kinds of male behaviour as the layers of prejudice and disbelief which have
hitherto concealed them are peeled away. Let me give some examples.
First, the L’Orange/Egger paper, in analysing conviction rates since the
passage of the 1981 legislation, exhibited this propensity. Their paper
is an
overwhelming demonstration of the success of the 1981 law reform packag
e.
Reports have increased, police acceptance of those reports as a basis f
or
investigation has increased, guilty pleas have increased, the acquittal rate
in
contested cases has decreased, the humiliating corroboration warning has been
dramatically curtailed, evidence of sexual experience of the victim is now
admitted only exceptionally. In summary, the conviction rate is now a
little
higher than that in other serious offences against the person. It is an impressive
achievement, cogently demonstrated. Yet, even so, the authors raise the
question
whether the rate is ‘acceptable’. Whilst properly and carefully pointing out that
such a question is beyond the scope of their paper, they do nevertheless
seem
to indicate their own view:
Furthermore, the extent to which juries acquit persons accused
of sexual assault is not just a question of criminal law and procedure.
Jury decisions are also a reﬂection of society’s views about women,
sexuality and relationships. Acquittals are to some degree a reﬂection
of a much broader problem of confusion, prejudice and repressiveaiin.’
attitudes towards sexuality in society. Claims that ‘rape victims don’t
act like that’ and ‘she asked for it’ are not just constructions of the
defence counsel expounded without constraint in the criminal trial.
They actively draw upon existing stereotypes and attitudes in the
community. (page 28)
l0
This passage. taken in conjunction with their earlier view that ‘often the victim
is still tried and found guilty’ amounts to an attack upon jury competence in
this area. The jury is still the most reliable and visible safeguard of fairness in
the criminal justice system. There are many interest groups who attack it for
precisely this reason. Feminists, and everyone else who is repelled by the sexual
victimisation of women, should ponder the wisdom of aligning themselves,
however guardedly or obliquely, with such persons.
Another example concerns the debate at the seminar on the unsworn
statement. Clearly, this was a lively bone of contention. The L’Orange/Egger
paper put the debate into its full procedural and philosophical context, that this
statement represents the only occasion in a criminal trial when a witness has
the opportunity to tell a story in his or her own words. Accordingly, they raised
the question whether the whole question of criminal procedure should not be
reviewed from the point of view of enabling more witnesses, particularly
victims, to have such an opportunity, though not necessarily of course by way
of an unsworn statement. In a sense, the debate raised later by Byme concerning
the videotaping of interviews with alleged victims of child sexual abuse is an
aspect of this same concern, though it was, of course, raised for quite different
motives. Unfortunately, some of the contributors from the ﬂoor became
extremely emotive, one suggesting for example that ‘it stinks’ and that at the
very least the right to make such a statement should be abolished in relation to
cases involving a sexual assault. Woods, Q.C., put the matter in an appropriate
context by pointing out that ‘it is wrong . . . to put forward in the interests
of law reform views which are excessively emotional based upon the wrong
theory that most rapists are escaping.’ (page 79)
A ﬁnal example concerned the evidence of children. In Thornthwaite’s
written paper. the view was expressed that “it is a world-wide fact that children
do not tell lies in relation to sexual abuse that has been committed upon them .
by a person in authority." (page 63) When this view was questioned from the
floor, Ms. Nixon. on behalf of Thornthwaite. defended it. It is, of course, the
building block upon which to construct especially protective rules for receiving
the evidence of child victims. What did not emerge sufficiently during the
seminar, however, is the extent to which this is an article of faith rather than
of empirical fact. Moreover, the evidence for a contrary view was not mentioned
at all. As to the first point, the most authoritative recent article on the matter
(McCord, “Expert Psychological Evidence about Child Complainants in Sexual
Abuse Cases,” 77 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology) rather lamely
states:
. . . there is every reason to believe that false reports of child sexual abuse
are very rare. Although it is probably impossible to verify this observation
empirically, as a matter of common sense and human experience it must
be true. Most people simply do not make false crime reports.
Yet available Australian material throwing a different perspective on to the
matter (Wilson, “False Complaints by Children of Sexual Abuse,” April 1986
Legal Service Bulletin) could have been cited. Included in that article is
reference to a telling Western Australian case in which a schoolteacher
successfully sued a teenage female student for defamation arising out of a
complaint of sexual abuse. It is facile and potentially dangerous to construct a
legal ediﬁce upon the notion that all children are innocent and ingenuous. Such
a process could only occur in the sort of pro-victim, anti-offender climate of
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opinion currently prevailing in this area—a climate which could endanger the
presumption of innocence and the checks and balances which traditionally form
part of our rules of criminal procedure to give substance to that presumption.
I have already indicated that, apart from the blemish I identiﬁed, the
L’Orange/Egger paper was a superb Overview of the effects of the law reform
package passed in 1981. It is a model of the sort of evaluation which should,
ideally, follow upon major social reforms in the‘area of criminal justice policy.
We know where we were trying to go; we can see to what extent we are getting
there. Their message, I believe, is a cause for real satisfaction. The fine tuning
measures they suggest are certainly worthy of careful consideration.
No less impressive is Byrne’s overview of the 1985 legislative package
relatingto child sexual abuse and the means of dealing with it. The ﬁve statutes
are complex and interlinking, but amount to a determined effort to create a
scheme which will encourage reporting, minimise traumas at the investigation
and trial stages for the child, and maintain the presumption of innocence. In
some ways, the most interesting aspect of the package is that of post-charge,
pre-trial diversion of suitable offenders. The aim is to preserve preservable
family units where the offender is redeemable, and the philosophy focuses more
on the social'pathology of this offence than on the wickedness of the offender.
Of course, a relatively small proportion of such situations and offenders will be
suitable for such disposition. It emerged, in response to a question from the
ﬂoor, that New South Wales is to commence the pilot scheme in mid-1987. This
is a radical initiative and deserves evaluation of the calibre which the 1981
sexual assault law reform package has received. Interestingly, South Australia
seems likely, assuming it follows the recommendation of its Child Sexual Abuse
Task Force which reported late in 1986, to await-any such evaluation before
adopting a similar scheme.
This seminar was clearly as informative and provocative as are most of
those held by the Sydney University Institute of Criminology. The series of
publications based upon such proceedings is now firmly established as one of
the primary resources of Australian criminology. In this respect, the high
scholarly standard of this collection of papers will add to our understanding in
a most perplexing and contentious area of social policy.
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ADULT VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT: AN EVALUATION OF THE
REFORMS*
Ms. Helen L’Orange, Director Women’s Co-ordination Unit.
Dr Sandra Egger, Premier’s Department, N.S.W.
Introduction
In 1981 major changes to the law of sexual assault were introduced in New
South Wales. The ambitiOus scope of these reforms is clear from the
Parliamentary debate:
This is an historic measure and one of the most important
reforms this Government has ever presented to this Parliament. The
object of the principal bill—the Crimes (Sexual Assault) Amendment
Bill—is to remedy major defects in the law relating to rape and sexual
assault. ~
~ These reforms are designed to protect the victims of rape from
further victimization under the legal process; to encourage rape
victims to report offences to the authorities; to facilitate the
administration of justice and the conviction of guilty offenders; at the
same time, to preserve the rights of the accused; and to serve an
educative function in further changing community attitudes to sexual
assault.' ' ‘
The aim of the present paper is to assess the changes brought about by the
reforms and to re-assess the reform goals themselves six years later.
The 1970’s represented a decade of awareness, optimism and activism for
women. The political nature of crimes of violence against women was
increasingly recognised and many feminist organisations focussed on rape law
reform as a key objective. The late 1970’s and early 1980’s saw reforms to the
laws of rape introduced in many different jurisdictions all over the world.2 The
New South Wales reforms _ we’re the most extensive and radical reforms
Undertaken in Australia at the time. The question we seek to address is whether
the optimism of the period was justiﬁed. Was rape law reform an appropriate
political strategy for women’s groups to adopt? Does the law now adequately
meet the goals of protection, punishment, prevention and education? Are rape
victims treated in a more humane and just fashion by the legal process? '
The N.S.W. Reforms
Under the sweeping amendments contained in the Crimes (Sexual Assault)
Amendment Act, 1981, the common law offence of rape was abolished and
replaced with a series of sexual assault offences of differing degrees of
seriousness. The single maximum penalty of penal servitude for life was replaced
by a series of penalties of 20, 12 and 7 years for the 3 graduated categories of
sexual assault.
“ The opinions expressed in this paper are.those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the
‘views of the New South Wales Government.
' N.S.W. Hansara’, Legislative Assembly, l8th March, 1981.
2 Reforms were enacted in Canada, the U.S.A., England and in the Australian States of Western
Australia. Victoria, South Australia, Tasmania and New South Wales.
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The offences of sexual assault category I and category 2 involve actual
violence, or a threat of violence with a weapon and there is no requirement
thatlack of consent be proved. The violence or threat may be directed towards
a third person who is present' or nearby.
 
. Sexual assault category (5. 61D) requires proof of lack of consent. The
circumstances which vitiate consent are described in S.V61D (3). ‘Threats or
terror’ capable of vitiating conSent may be directed to the victim or to third
parties. Mistake as to the identity of the other person or mistake as to the fact
of marriage both vitiate consent under s.6lD (3) (a). The circumstances capable
of vitiating consent are not exhaustively listed in the statute and thus the
common law principles continue to govern other types of circumstances which
vitiate consent.
The mental requirements for sexual assault category 3 are substantially the
same as the requirements at common law. The offence requires knowledge of
lack of consent or subjective recklessness. The test is essentially that articulated
in Morgan3 and the defence of honest mistake applies.
The justiﬁcation for these changes was that—
— the common .law ‘rape offence unduly emphasized the sexual
component as distinctfrom the violence component’; ‘
— ‘the term rape involved an unacceptable stigma for victims’;
— the primary emphasis should be changed ‘from consent to sexual
penetration or intercourse’; .
— ‘there should be a graduation of offences of sexual assault with distinct
ranges of penalties rather that one major offence of rape with a
virtually unlimited penalty range’.‘
A statutory deﬁnition of sexual intercourse was also provided in the
reforms which was signiﬁcantly wider than the common law concept of
penetration. It is also gender neutral. Sexual assault for the purposes of s. 618,
C, & D, includes vaginal intercourse, and intercourse, fellatio, cunnilingus, the
insertion of objects and parts of the body into'the anus or vagina and the
continuation of sexual intercourse. The primary justiﬁcation for these changes
was that such acts may render the victim ‘much more seriously injured,
physically and psychologically that a female into whose vagina a penis is
inserted without consent.5
The reforms also signiﬁcantly restricted the cross-examination of victims
about prior sexual behaviour. Unlike some previous attempts to deal with the
problem of offensive and irrelevant cross-examination of the complainant’s
character and reputation by reference to prior sexual behaviour, the New South
Wales reforms did not seek to retain a general discretion for the admission of
such evidence.6 The approach adopted in New South Wales was to provide a
blanket prohibition coupled with speciﬁcally deﬁned exceptions.
3 D.P.P. v Morgan & Others (1975) 61 Cr. App. R., p. 136.
4 Woods G. D. Sexual Assault Law Reforms in NS. W.: A commentary on the Crimes (Sexual Assault)
Amendment Act [981 and Cognate Act, 1981, Dept. of Attorney—General & Justice, Sydney, p. 12.
5 Woods, t'bid. p. 9.
6 General prohibitions were enacted in 1976 in England and in South Australia: the Sexual Oﬂences
(Amendment) Act. 1976; The Evidence Act 1929-1976 (S.A.).
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5. 409B (2) provides a complete prohibition on the admission of evidence
relating to the sexual reputation of the complainant. 5. 4098 (3)—(8) prohibits
evidence of prior sexual behaviour unless it falls within one of the situations
described in subsections (a) to (f). The legislation narrowly deﬁnes these
evidentiary gates. The limitations provided in 5. 409B & C also apply to the.
unsworn statement.
The major justiﬁcation for these restrictions was ‘to overcome the problem
that the defence in a rape trial is commonly conducted not merely by
legitimately testing genuinely relevant allegations but by blackening the,
character and reputation of the complainant in respect of sexual behaviour
unconnected with the alleged crime’.7
Under the new law the common law immunity for males under 14 years
of age and for husbands was abolished. The law of recent complaint was also
modiﬁed. Where delay or absence of complaint is raised 5. 4053 requires that
the jury be warned that this does not indicate false complaint and that such
delays may occur for ‘good reasons’. These modiﬁcations recognised the
reluctance of many victims to report sexual assault’3 and were designed to ensure
that ‘genuine victims should not be deterred from coming forward and reporting
of’fences’.‘9
s. 405C abolished the compulsory corroboration-warning. Under the new
discretionary provision ‘the judge will not be compelled to utilize the traditional
formula of denigration which identiﬁes women as especially untrustworthy.lo
The Score of the Reforms
In general terms, the most signiﬁcant and ambitious changes to the law
involved the replacement of the single rape offence with a series of sexual assault
offences emphasizing the violent rather than the sexual component of the act,
the broadening of the deﬁnition of sexual intercourse, and the strict limitations
on the admission of sworn and unsworn evidence of prior sexual behaviour and
reputation.
To the extent that other contentious issues were tackled, the reforms may
be viewed as tinkering around the edges rather than drastically altering the
substance of the law. The thorny problems of consent and the mental
requirements of the offences were largely ignored in relation to sexual assault
category 3, the most common offence."
One possible hypothesis is that the offences involving actual or threatened
violence would be more numerous and thus the problems in relation to consent
would operate only in a small number of cases. Empirical evidence suggests the
reverse.'2 The majority of sexual assaults do no involve the inﬂiction of serious
7 Woods, op. cit. p. 3|.
3 Young, Rape Study Vol. I, A Discussion ofLaw & Practice. Dept. of Justice and the Institute of
Criminology, New Zealand, 1983.
Scott D. & Hewitt L. ‘Short term adjustment to rape and the utilization of a sexual assault
counselling service.’ A & N.‘ Z. Journal ofCrimino/ogy 1983, 16, p. 93.
9 Woods. op. cit. p. 26. .
“ Woods op. cit. p. 28. _ ’
H Warner K. The Mental Element and Consent under the New Rape Laws’, Criminal Law Journal.
I983. 7. p. 245,
Scott & Hewitt op. cit. (see footnote 8).u
 l3
bodily harm or threats with weapons. Furthermore, proof of lack of consent in
cases involving violence or threats is clearly less onerous for the Crown to
establish. It is precisely in a sexual assault where there is no overt violence or
threat with an oﬁensive weapon that the problems in relation to lack of consent
and the accused’s state of mind create the greatest diﬂiculties.
Thus although the 1981 reforms courageously tackled the issues of violence,
the type of sexual act, and the treatment of victims in court, there were also
signiﬁcant issues not addressed.
The Operation of the Law
In assessing the operation of the amendments extensive use was made of
the excellent work of the New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and
Research.” The Bureau evaluation study of the new sexual assault laws was
conducted at the request of the Attorney General. The study examined
transcripts of all rape and sexual assault (categories 1 to 3) offences entering
committal in two separate 18 month time periods. The ﬁrst time period
involved all cases charged with rape or attempted rape under the s. 63 and s.
65 of the Crimes Act. 1900. The second time period involved all cases charged
with sexual assault categories 1 to 3 or attempt under s. 618, 61C, 61D, or 61F,
of the Crimes (Sexual Assault) Amendment Act, 1981.
In the present paper the New South Wales amendments are evaluated in
relation to a set of broad principles which have been regarded by many
commentators as appropriate aims for the law of rape.”
1. The Symbolic and Educational Functions of the Criminal Law
The symbolic role of the criminal law is often stressed by women’s
organisations in relation to rape, domestic violence, and pornography.15 The
criminal law in morally condemning certain types of behaviour and attributing
moral blameworthiness to persons committing such acts plays an important role
in shaping community attitudes. The moral dimensions of the criminal law
serve to reinforce and inﬂuence community attitudes. -
The areas of criminal law of most concern in feminist analyses are those
involving violence against women, sexual violence against women, and attitudes
‘3‘ N.S.W. Bureau 01' Crime Statistics & Research. Interim Report I: Crimes (Sexual Assault)
.‘Imettt/metti.-le.'. I98l. I985.
N.S.\\'. Bureau ofCrimc Statistics &"Rcsearch. Interim Report 2: .S'e.\'tla/ .~IssanlI—Cottrt ()uteome.
I985 - ‘
N.S.W. Bureau ol‘Crime Statistics & Research. Interim Report 3: Court Procedures. I987.
” Law Reform Commission of Victoria. I)i.\'en.r.\'ion Paper No. .7, Rape & Allied Ollettt't's. I986.
Report oil/1e .-lt/ri.\'orr Group on the Lair ol'que (The Hcilbron Committee) H.M.S.O. Cmnd
6353 London I975. I
I’iekard T. ‘C'ulpable Mistakes & Rape: Relating Mcns Rea to the Crime‘. 1980. 30. University
(t/"l'orottlo Law Journal. p. 75. ‘
Wells ('.. 'Swatting the Subjective Bug‘ C'rim. L. R. 1982 p. 209. ,
Nallin N. .In Inqnirr into the .S‘ti/ixtantire Lair ofRape. I984 Women‘s Advisor‘s Ofﬁce. Dept.
of Premier. Adelaide. .
Tempkin .l. ‘Towards a Modern Law of Rape‘ (I983) 45 illotlern Lair Rerieu' p. 399.
‘5 Report of the N.S.W. Task Force on Domestic Violence. 1981. Wilson E.. Il'liat is to lie (lone
tlltoul little/teeagainst II'otne/t. Penguin. 1983.
Edwards S. I-‘emu/e .S'e.\'ualit_r and [lie Lair. Martin Robertson. 1981.
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towards women’s sexuality as portrayed in pornographic publications. It is
generally held that the criminal law has a valuable role to play in changing
attitudes towards sexuality and in changing relationships between men and
women by clearly and strongly condemning unacceptable behaviour.”
'In the context of the New South Wales amendments it is difficult to
determine if any broader social changes have been generated by a change in
the law. However, it may be assumed that at the very least, the changes to the
law may inﬂuence the attitudes ofrape victims and the attitudes of those
involved in the administration of criminal justice. It may be expected that under
the new law more victims would be prepared to report to the police in the
knowledge that the legal process has been modiﬁed, and that the police would
be more prepared to accept reported rapes.
Table] presents the number of offences reported to the police in New
South Wales and the number of offences accepted by the police in the period
from 1972 to 1986.l7 The number of offences reported to the police nearly
trebled in this period (1972: 342; 1986: 961). A comparison of 1980 (the last
full year of the old law) and 1982 (the ﬁrst full year of the new law) indicates
an increase of 23 per cent in the number of offences reported to the police.
Whilst such ﬁndings are promising, the possibility ofa real increase in the
incidence of sexual assault in the same period cannot be discounted and thus
the ﬁndings are equivocal.
The increasing acceptance. of reports of sexual assaults ,by the police also
shows a marked change in the last 15 years. Fewer reports were rejected as false
complaints. In 1972, 56.1 per cent of reports were accepted by the police. In
1986, 81.8 per cent of reports were accepted by the police. The trends over the
last decade has been a gradual increase and thus it is unlikely that the law alone
is responsible for the greater degree of acceptance. The establishment of sexual
assault centres in hospitals,” community education campaigns, additional police
training on sexual assault, and a generally improved awareness of sexual assault
in the community may also have contributed to the greater degree of willingness
on the part of the police to accept more reports as genuine. However, it is at
least a plausible conclusion that the reforms to the law have played some role
in these changes. The greatest change occurred between 1980 and 1982 at the
time the new laws were introduced. .
"‘ Law Reform Commission ofVictoria (1986) op. cit. (see footnote I4).
Nalﬁn (1984) op. cit.
Wells (I982) up. ('it.
'7 New South Wales Police Statistics. 1972—1986.
'x N.S.W. Bureau of Crime StatiSIics & Research. Interim Report 1. op. cit. (51w footnote l3).
 
 TABLE 1
I Sexual Assault Offencesl Reported to the Police and Offences Accepted by the
Police 1972 to 1986
' Year No. Reported N0. Accepted % Accepted
1972 342 192 , 56.1
1973 366 191 52.2
1974 383 252 65.8
1975 416 269 64.7
1976 423 292 69.0
1977 477 344 - 72.1
1978 514 369 71.2
1979 565 ' 355 62.8
1980 615 - 387 62.9
19812 578 402 69.5
1982 758 641 84.6
1983 842 ' 738 87.6
1984 863 739 85.6
1985 784 ' 632 80.6
1986 931 762 81.8
'This includes all rape and attempt rape offences until l4th July. 1981 and all sexual assaults
categories I. 2 and 3 and attempt subsequent to this date.
. 3 The new laws came into effect on 14th July. 1981.
The more fundamental questions of whether there have been changes in
‘ attitudes towards female sexuality and changes in relationships between men
and women is‘more difficult to answer. The relationship between the law and
political and social attitudes is one of mutual inﬂuence and at the same time
independence.” Such broad social and political changes are likely to take time
and may be manifested in a variety of‘ways.
Some writers have tended to overrely on the symbolic function of the law
“and assume that law reform is:
‘intrinsically a transfomer of action’ and that a ‘change in legislation will
generate a corresponding change in social behaviour’.20
As argued by Brown2| it cannot be assumed that legislative change in itself
will necessarily deliver the desired effects. At the very least it must be
accompanied by open and public debate, education, changes in administrative
and institutional policies and practices, and reforms aimed at improving the
social and economic status of women. Legislative reforms should seek to ensure
that repressive ideologies are not reflected and recreated in the law, but cannot
alone guarantee social transformation.
"‘ Smart (Z. The Tin 'l'lml Iii/Id. London. Rutledge. 1984.
3" (‘ornish .-\.. 'l’ublic Drunkcnncss in N.S.W.: From Criminality to- Welfare”. .»1.1\’.Z..I. 0f
(-I‘illll'lll)/ll.“"l'. I985. 18. p. 73. '
3' Brown D.. The Politics of Reform‘ in Richardson M.. Ronals C. and Zdenkovski G. (eds). The
Criminal Minx/ice Slit/0m 1'0]. 2. Photo Press. Sydney. 1987.
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2. The Protection of Victims of Rapefrom Further l’t’c‘titttt’n‘ttion by the Legal
Process .
The treatment of victims of sexual assault by the legal process has been a
key issue in recent times. The humiliation and distress experienced by victims
during the trial has been described in many studies.22 It is often claimed that
the victim feels as though she. not the accused, is on trial. An examination of
the evidentiary rules and procedures traditionally operating in rape trials
provides strong support for theseclaims. The victim’s character and previous
sexual life are often subject to close and offensive cross-examination. She is
frequently protrayed as promiscuous and untruthful.
Any delay in reporting the offence is often portrayed by the defence as
evidence of fabrication, despite the many studies demonstrating the-complex
factors which mitigate against immediate disclosure.23 Finally in many
jurisdictions the jury is warned that it is ‘dangerous to convict’ on the words
of the victim alone. She is again portrayed as being particularly prone to lying.
The most signiﬁcant of the New South Wales reforms were those directed
at alleviating the personal trauma experienced by victims during the trial.
2.] Delay in Complaint
S. 4058 (2) requires that where absence or delay in complaint is raised the
judge shall warn the jury that this does not necessarily. indicate that the
allegation was false and that there may have been ‘good reasons‘ for the
hesitation.
The Bureau study found that delay in complaint was raised in 44.9% of
cases heard under the amendments and 38.8% of cases heard under the previous
law“. The data on the s. 4058 warning was unfortunately incomplete: the judge’s
summing up was not available in slightly more than one third of the cases where
delay was raised. The statutory warning was not given in 3 of the cases where
delay was raised. Further analysis of the operation of the warning is prevented
by the high number of cases where the summing up was not available.
However, a recent judgement in the Court of Criminal-Appeal has raised
the question of the proper relationship between 5. 4058 and the common law
direction“. The court held that in addition to giving the s. 4058 direction. the
judge should as a general rule continue to direct the jury that the absence or
delay in complaint be taken into account in evaluating the evidence of the
complaint and in determining whether to believe the complaint. The question
is whether this effectively waters down the s. 4058 requirement.
Should legislative direction be given to indicate that the s. 4058 warning
expressly excludes the common law direction as articulated in R v Kilby26 or is
it appropriate that both directions be given?
33 Adler Z.. ‘Rapc—The Intention of Parliament and the Practice of the Courts’. Modern Law
Rt’rit‘u'. l982. 45. p. 667.
Dumaresq D.. Rape—Sexuality in the Law,M/_fl981. N5 &6. p. 41.
-‘ Toner B.. The Facts ufRapc. Hutchinson. London. I979.
N.S.W. Bureau of Crime Statistics & Research. Interim Report 3 op. cit. (see footnote 13).
R v Davies. (1985) 3 N.S.W. Law Reports. p. 277.
Ki/Iu' v The Queen (1973) 129 CLR 460.I
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 2. 2 Corroboration ‘ .
The 1981 amendments abolished the requirement that th
e corroboration
warning (‘unsafe to convict’) be given in sexual assault trials.
The new warning
is now discretionary. The Bureau study found that the corrobo
ration warning
was not given in the majority of cases tried under the new law
(71.5%).
2.3 Evidentiary Restriction on Sexual Reputation and Experience
The study by the Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research fo
und that the
evidentiary restrictions in 5. 4098 and C signiﬁcantly red
uced the number of
cases in which evidence of the complainant’s sexual pas
t was raised and
admitted in court proceedings.
2.3.1 Sexual Reputation
An absolute prohibition against evidence of sexual reputation
is prOvided
in 5. 409B (2) of the Crimes (Sexual Assault) Amendment A
ct, 1981. Table 2
presents the proportion of cases where such evidence was admit
ted at committal
in cases heard under the 1981 amendments as compared to t
he previous law.
 
TABLE 2.
Sexual reputation admitted in evidence at committal.
cases heard under the cases heard under the
1981 Amendments previous law
N. 0/0 N. %
Not admitted 209 92.8 165
86.4
Admitted 16' - 7.1 . 262..
13.6
' In one additional case reputation was raised but rejected by th
e court.
3 In two additional cases reputation was raised but rejected by
the court.
In 16 cases heard under the 1981 amendments sexual reputation
was
admitted (7.1%), despite the total prohibition. Seven were
references to
prostitution and nine to reputation for promiscuity.
Table 3 presents the proportion of cases, where evidenc
e of sexual
reputation was admitted at trial.
, TABLE 3.
Sexual reputation admitted in evidence at trial
cases heard under the cases heard under the
 
I 981 Amendments previous law
N. . °/o . N. 0/0
Not admitted 74 ‘ 93.6 73 . 93.5
Admitted 5' 6.3 5 6.5
' In two additional cases reputation was raised in the record of interview
but deleted.
In 5 cases heard under the 1981 amendments, reputatio
n evidence was
admitted (6.3%). Three were references to prostitution and t
wo were references
to promiscuity.
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The ﬁndings are of interest in a number of respects. Firstly, it appears that
evidence of reputation (what others believe regarding sexual character) was not
frequently raised even before the reforms to the law“. However all the
references to reputation under the previous law were references to promiscuity.
There were no references to prostitution.
Secondly despite the absolute prohibition imposed by 5. 409B (2) reputation
evidence was admitted, even in the higher courts.
At trial the study found that reputation was admitted in 3 of 5 cases via
the record of interview. It appears greater caution may be necessary to edit such
documents prior to admission at trial. The admission of evidence relating to
reputation of promiscuity is clearly in contravention of the legislation. The
prostitution references are more complex since in the majority of cases the
sexual assault arose in circumstances involving a commercial sexual transaction.
The exclusion of such information may not be possible because of its relevance
to the circumstances leading up to and the commission of the offence.
Legislative amendment may be desirable to specify an exception under these
narrow circumstances.
The Bureau of Crime Statistics & Research report comments on the failure
of the amendments to provide a statutory deﬁnition of reputation. They cite as
problems the vagueness of the concept, the exclusion of reputation of chastity,
and the exclusion of reputation evidence even if it is the ‘lynch pin’ of the
Crown or defence case".
Apart from the prostitution problem already raised, the courts do not
appear to have had difﬁculty with the concept of reputation. No evidence is
presented of the courts misunderstanding reputation or querying its meaning.
The main problem appears to be that in a small number of cases the courts are
not mindful of the prohibition.
Futhermore, the exclusion of reputation of chastity and reputation
generally, even if the ‘lynch pin’ of the case, is considered to be proper: it has
no bearing on whether a women has been sexually assaulted or not on this
occasion. ‘ '
2.3.2 Sexual Experience
Under the 1981 amendments, evidence of sexual experience is inadmissible
except under the exceptions provided in 5. 409B (3) (a) to (i) and 5. 409B (5).
The approach taken by the New South Wales legislation was to specify the
circumstances which must be satisfied before admission. In brief, these are—
s. 4093 (3) (a)—sexual activity (or a lack of) at the time of the offence. (“a
connected set of circumstances”); '
5. 409B (3) (b)—evidence relating to an existing or recent relationship;
 
27 The Bureau report asserts that the literature on the subject suggests that reputation was a standard
or frequent defence. This may be questioned. Both Woods and others refer to both sexual
experience and reputation as common defences but do not assign relative frequencies. Most of
the debate has been on experience.
2" Bureau of Crime Statistics & Research, Interim Report 3 op. cit.
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Section 4093 (3) (c)—
. where the accused denies intercourse took place and the
evidence is relevant to the presence of semen, injury,
disease, or pregnancy;
Section 4093 (3) (d)— ~
' where there. is evidence of a disease in the accused (or
victim) and its absence in the victim (or conversely, the
accused);
Section 4098 (3) (e)—
where the victim only alleged sexual assault after the
discovery of pregnancy or disease;
Section 4098 (3) (f) and section 409B (5)—
where the prosecution alleges that the complainant has or
has not had previous sexual experience.
This approach may be contrasted with the English approach where no
attempt was‘ made to specify the circumstances where such evidence can
be
admitted. The principles regulating admission in the English law are those of
relevance, unfairness to the defendant, and whether it goes merely to credit' or
to' an issue in the trial.29
I .
Table 4 presents the proportion of cases where sexual experience was raised
and admitted in evidence at committal.
TABLE 4
 
Evidence of Sexual Experience at Committal
cases heard Icases heard
under the under the
1981 Amendments previous l'aw
N. % N. %
Sexual experience raised 75 33.2 i 126
65.7
Sexual experience not raised . 151 66.8 66 34.3
100.0 100.0
Sexual experience raised and _.
admitted . 70 . 93.3 126 100.0
Sexual experience raised and _ 1 I I
not admitted 5 . 6.7 — —
100.0 100.0
2" R v Lawrence (1977) Crim. L.R. p. 492.
R v Viola (1982) I W.L.R.. ll38.
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Under committals heard under the previous law, prior sexual experience
was raised and admitted in 65.7% of all cases (N = 126). In committals heard
under the amendments, sexual experience Was raised in 33.2% of cases
(N = 75) and admitted in 31.0% of cases (N = 70). Although the results
demonstrate a signiﬁcant drop in the proportion of cases where sexual
experience was admitted after the '1981 amendments there was still a substantial
proportion where such evidence was admitted. Furthermore, in over half of
these cases no application was made to the magistratefor leave to introduce
the evidence and no argument was made as to how the evidence was admissible
under the exceptions provided in 3. 4098. A further problem identiﬁed in the
Bureau study at committal was the elasticity of the concept of recent or existing
relationship (5. 409B (3) (b)). It varied between 1 week and 6 years. The absence
of any direction by appellate courts on the meaning of this subsection is a
matter of some concern.
At trial the ﬁndings were similar. Table 5 describes the, proportion of cases
where evidence of prior sexual experience was raised and/or admitted.
 
TABLE 5
Evidence of Sexual Experience at Trial
cases heard ‘ cases heard .
under the under the
1981 Amendments previous law
N. » % N. %
Sexual experience raised 32 40.6 53 68.0
Sexual experience not raised 47 59.4 25 32.0
100.0 100.0
Sexual experience raised and
admitted 26 81.2 52 98.1
Sexual experience raised and .
not admitted 6 18.8 1 1-0
In trials heard under the previous law, prior sexual experience was raised
and admitted in evidence in 66.6% of cases (N = 52). In trials heard under
the amendments, sexual experience was raised in 40.6% of cases (N = 32) and
admitted in 32.9% of cases (N = 26).
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TABLE 6
The Operation of the Exceptions in the Higher Courts
exception
' N.
Existing/recent relationship
12
Sexual intercourse contested
8
Prosecution argues experience or no experience
12
Sexual activity at time of offence
3
4
Not according to the exceptions
(Note: there were multiple reasons in some
cases hence the total is greater
than the number of cases.)
‘
The range of time periods-included in the conc
ept of recent relationship
varied between 1 week and in excess of 12 week
s. The desirability of judicial
comment on this concept is again demonstrated.
The results thus indicate that
in a small number of cases (N = 4) th
e evidence appears to have been
improperly admitted.
In general the operation of the prohibition an
d exceptions appears to have
reduced the admission of sexual experience
, and narrowed the scope of the
material and its use. However the Bureau concl
uded that ‘a wider scope than
was perhaps intended by legislature has been give
n to some of its provisions . . .’
and ‘that much of the evidence of sexual experien
ce accepted by the local courts
would be inadmissible in a higher court’.30
These ﬁndings suggest that careful consid
eration should be given to the
need for further legislative clariﬁcation of t
he exceptions. It is of interest that
in 6 years of operation there is virtually no
case law on the operation of these
evidentiary provisions. This may be cont
rasted with the English provisions
where there is quite a substantial body o
f case law on the meaning of s. 2.
Perhaps attention should be given by t
he prosecuting authorities to the need t
o
appeal in cases where the exception is app
lied in an excessively broad manner.
The need for the prosecuting authorit
ies to object to the improper admiss
ion
of such evidence was also demon
strated, particularly at committa
l.
Consideration should also be given to the
means whereby the proper scope of
the provisions can be conveyed to magis
trates.
The New South Wales amendments thus
represent one of the more
successful procedural reforms in the law
of sexual assault. Prior sexual
experience is not raised in the majority of trials
and the personal trauma for
the victim is thus lessened.
 
’0 Bureau of Crime Statistics & Re
search, Interim Report 3. op. cit.
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However, it may be desirable to further extend the application of the
provisions of 5. 4098. In a trial for an offence other than a prescribed sexual
offence the provisions do not apply. This may create problems where the offence
charged is for example, 5. 112~of the Crimes Act 1900 (break and enter with
intent to commit a felony) and the felony is a sexual assault. The victim under
these circumstances may be subject to cross-examination on prior sexual
behaviour. '
In general, it appears that the legislative speciﬁcation of evidentiary ‘gates’
has been more successful than the provision of a general judicial discretion.
Although the Michigan laws provide clearly deﬁned evidentiary gates, their
operation and effectiveness has been questioned because of the likelihood that
they undulyinfringe the defendant’s sixth amendment right of confrontation.3|
Such constitutional conflicts do not arise in New South Wales and the legislative
restrictions have not been read down in this way.
It has been suggested that in jurisdictions where a general discretion is
provided, leave to cross-examine on prior sexual history is readily granted.32 In
England, the Sexual Oﬂences (Amendment) Act 1976 gives the judge discretion
whether or not to admit evidence of the complainant’s sexual experience. It does
not provide guidelines for the exercise of the discretion. Section 2 provides that
leave to examine or cross-examine should be granted by the judge ‘if and only
if he is satisﬁed that it would be unfair to that defendant to refuse to allow the
evidence to be adduced or the question to be asked’.
Adler found in a study of the Central Criminal Court in London that
applications for leave to introduce evidence of prior sexual experience were
made on behalf of 40 per cent of defendants. Three-quarters of the applications
were wholly or partly successful and so resulted in the introduction of some
evidence of prior sexual experience. Thus in approximately one-third of all cases
prior sexual history was admitted at the request of the defence. In an unspeciﬁed
number, sexual experience was introduced by the defence counsel without ﬁrst
applying for leave or by the judge. The total number of cases where prior sexual
experience was admitted is not given but Adler concluded that ‘the majority of
trials proceeded as previously’. '3
According to Adler, applications for leave argued that prior sexual
experience was relevant to the complainant’s credibility, to issues in the trial
other than consent, and, in 80 per cent of cases, to consent.
The applications based on consent were most often concerned with whether
the complainant was a virgin or whether she had certain sexual proclivities (e.g.,
intercourse with several partners, intercourse with ‘coloured men’). The
3' Dreisig, W. P. ‘Criminal Law—Sexual Offences—A Critical Analysis of Michigan’s Criminal
Sexual Conduct Act”. Wayne Law Review. 1976, 23, p. 203.
’2 Adler, Z. op. cit. (see footnote 22).
McNamara, P. ‘Cross-examination of the complainant in a trial for rape’, Criminal Law Journal,
1981.5, p. 25. r
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diﬂiculties. faced by judges in applying 5. 2 was discussed in R. v. Viola but the
court declined to lay down any guidelines. Viola '3 case did however lay down
a series of questions that the judge should ask himself:
_ Are the questions relevant according to the ordinary rules of
evrdence? ‘ -
If yes, are the questions merely seeking to establish that the
complainant should not be believed because of her sexual experience?
/\
If yes, they should be If no, are the questions
excluded in exceptional cases. relevant to an issue in the'trial,
e.g., consent?
If yes, they should be
admitted.
It has been argued that these questions do not provide adequate guidelines
and thus: .
the principles established in nineteenth century case law are to a large
extent still governing the implementation of the 1976 Act.33
Opposing points of view have been put by others.34 The English Criminal
Law Review Committee concluded after discussion with judges and members
of the criminal bar that there were no grounds for concern on the operation of
the discretionary provisions.” They referred to the requirement that
such
evidence is only admissible if relevant to an issue in the trial in the light of the
way the case is being run. This does not- adequately recognise the fundamental
challenge being made to traditional concepts of sexuality reproduced in the
rape
trial. Women’s groups are questioning the concept of relevance, th
e way in
which cases are run and the value judgments traditionally applied by the
legal
process.
The view that prior sexual experience is relevant to the issue of cons
ent
as re-afﬁrmed in R. v. Viola is a continuing matter of concern. It reconstruc
ts
in the rape trial a passive view of female sexuality in contrast to the “n
ormal”
active view of male sexuality. Strong sexual passion is accepted as normal a
nd
appropriate for the male accused, where as an absence or strictly cir
cumscribed
form of sexuality is required for the victim. '
At no point do the proceedings assume a man’s intent to have
sexual intercourse is wrong; what is in question is whether he intend
ed
intercourse with the wrong partner.36
’3 Adler. Z. op. cit.. p.675.
3‘ Elliott. D. W. Rape Complainant’s Sexual Experience with Third Parties, C
rim. LR. 1984, p.
4.
'a 5 Criminal Law Revision Committee. Fifteenth Report (Chairman, Rt Hon. Lord Justice Lawton).
Sexual (II/buyer H.M.S.O.. C'Inm/., 9213. l984.
3" Dumaresq. 0.. I981. op. ciI.. p. 53 (see footnote 22).
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In contrast, it is assumed that if a woman has had sexual intercourse
outside a deﬁned sphere of permissible operation (e.g., marriage) then this has
a direct bearing on the issue of consent on this occasion. The concerns of the
women’s groups remain: only the particular event in question should be
relevant.
The New South Wales reforms tackled this by only permitting cross
examination on prior sexual experience under certain circumstances. The new
law thus narrows the concept of relevance: sexual experience is relevant to
consent only under the circumstances outlined in 5. 4093. This is preferable to
the position where the relevance of prior sexual experience to consent is at large,
as under the English law.
.The 1981 reforms did not however tackle the other court practices which
degrade and humiliate the victim. Conservative and repressive attitudes towards
women’s sexuality are still strongly reﬂected in other ways. The question of
consent is still muddied by the attempt to portray the victim as a woman of
loose morals who ‘asked for it’ by her dress (e.g., too short), her actions (e.g.,
hitching a lift), her words (e.g., she attempted to engage the accused in
conversation) and her alcohol or drug consumption. Her bodily reactions to the
assault may be probed1n minute detail111 the trial. Often the victim is still tried
and found guilty.
Her crime is of conduct unbecoming a rape victim, although such conduct
may be acceptable'and encouraged in other situations. For example, the clothing
or rather the absence of clothing Of page 3 girls is regarded as a positive image
of sexuality for the afternoon papers, but a negative or impermissibleimage for
the rape .victim Women’s groups have been critiCal of both images. 37
The discourse of rape does construct a speciﬁc sexuality, within
its own area, that is different for men and women and which produces
both rape victim and rapist.38
In addressing the sexuality arising from the discourse of rape, the most
common demand is for restrictions on the type of cross-examination allowed
in court. The New South Wales amendments have met this demand in relation ,
to prior sexual history but have not restricted the other ways in which repressive
attitudes towards women’s sexuality are reproduced in the court. The question
awaiting consideration is whether further restrictions on cross-examination
should be pursued or, whether such stereotypes of women’s sexuality should be
challenged more directly in other ways, both in the court and in the society at
large.
37 Rickford. F.. ‘The Dark Side oflhe Sun’. Marxism Today, l986, May, p. 28.
3" Dumaresq. D. 0p. ('il.. p. 4|.
 3. The Conviction and Punishment of Guilty Oﬂenders
Despite the empirical evidence suggesting that prevention and
rehabilitation are rarely achieved by the criminal justice system, the conviction
and punishment of wrongdoers remains a proper goal of rape law. As
argued
by the Victorian Law Reform Commission:
Even if the community cannot rely on the legal system to
eradicate sexual offences it can at least rely on it to do justice when
accused persons are convicted.39
Low conviction rates for rape have long been a matter of concern for
women’s groups. There have been numerous studies pointing to the relatively
low conviction rate for rape.‘0 The results from the Bureau study demonstrate
a higher committal and conviction rate under the amendments.“I Fewer cases
charged under the 1981 amendments lapsed at committal (18.4 per cent) than
under the previous law (25.3 per cent). The oVerall conviction rate was also
higher for cases charged under the 1981 amendments (82.7 per cent) than
previously (70.3 per cent). Furthermore, the conviction rate under the
amendments is now comparable to that of other serious offences against the
person: murder 82.3 per cent, major assault 80.7 per cent, all sexual offences
85.6 per cent.
The increased conviction rate is a product of two factors: an increase in
guilty pleas and a reduction in the percentage of acquittals. Firstly, there was
an increase of 10.2 per cent in the percentage of cases where a plea of guilty
was entered. Under the previous law 46.2 per cent of cases involved a plea of
guilty compared to 56.4 per cent under the amendments. Secondly, there was
a decline of 14.2 per cent in the acquittal rate under the new_ law. Of the cases
where a plea of not guilty was entered, 40.9 per cent were acquitted under the
1981 amendments compared with 55.1 per cent under the previous law. Thus
the ﬁndings of the Bureau study demonstrate an increase in convictions, an
increase in guilty pleas and a decrease in acquittals under the Crimes (Sexual
Assault) Amendment Act. 1981 as compared to the Crimes Act, 1900.
The sentencing of convicted offenders has been discussed extensively in
the public debate surrounding rape law reform. The New South Wales reforms
have been criticised for having the lowest maximum penalty in Australia for
sexual intercourse without consent.42 The Bureau study demonstrated a higher
imprisonment rate under the 1981 amendments than under the previous law.
Eighteen per cent of distinct offenders received non-custodial sentences after
the changes to the law compared with 30 per cent previously.
Furthermore. offenders sentenced under the 1981 amendments to
imprisonment more often received sentences in the ‘middle range perio
ds of
imprisonment, between 3 and 5 years,’ (19.3 per cent compared to 10.0 p
er
cent). Non-parole periods were however, generally shorter for
offenders
sentenced under the 1981 amendments than under the previous law.
3" Law Reform Commission of Victoria (1986). op. cit. (see footnote 14),
p. 4.
4" Nafﬁn. (1984). op. cit. (see footnote 14)
Law Reform Commission of Victoria (1986) op. cit.
Chappell D.. the Impact of Rape Legislation Reform, International Journal of
Women ’5 Studies
1984, 7. p. I.
4' N.S.W. Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, Interim Report 2, op.
cit.
‘3 Naffin op. cit.
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The increase in the conviction rate under the 1981 amendments is a ﬁnding
of some interest. There are obviously a number of factors which have
contributed to the change. The provision of a series of offences instead of a
single offence with a maximum of life is likely to have encouraged some accused
persons to plead guilty. The evidentiary restrictions and the reforms to the
corroboration warning may have resulted in a ‘fairer’ trial in some cases. There
are many other plausible explanations. However the issue of whether the
conviction and punishment of guilty offenders is now at an ‘acceptable’ level is
a difﬁcult question. It involves an assessment of the proper balance between
the rights of the accused and the conviction of the guilty. It raises questions
beyond the scope of the present paper.
Furthermore, the extent to which juries acquit persons accused of sexual
assault is not just a question of criminal law and procedure. Jury decisions are
also a'reﬂection of society’s views about women, sexuality and relationships.“3
Acquittals are to some degree a reﬂection of a much broader problem of
confusion, prejudice and repressive attitudes towards sexuality in society.
Claims that ‘rape victims don’t act like that’ and ‘she asked for it’ are not just
constructions of the defence counsel expounded without restraint in the criminal
trial. They actively draw on existing stereotypes and attitudes in the community.
4. The Protection of the Sexual Integrity of the Individual
The law should also aim to protect the individual against non-consensual
sexual violation.‘In doing so there should be an approximate correspondence
between the seriousness of the violation and the legal consequences. Acts which
involve a serious sexual violation should be recognised and punished more
severely than those where the violation is of a less serious nature. The New
South Wales amendments tackled this problem in several ways. Firstly, the role
of violence is emphasised as of primary importance by the introduction of a
series of sexual assaults with different penalties. Secondly, by expanding the
deﬁnition of sexual intercourse, acts which had previously been regarded as less
serious and hence classiﬁed as indecent assaults are now to be treated by the
law as of comparable seriousness to vaginal penetration by the penis. Finally,
by the abolition of status immunity for husbands and males under 14 years,
acts which had previously been exempt from criminal liability are now regarded
as serious sexual assaults.
The question at issue is whether the New South Wales law now more
appropriately reﬂects wider community views in the assignment of liability and
punishment to the crime of sexual assault. Although in the period under the
study there were only 2 cases which involved estranged husbands and no cases
involving males under 14 years. There appears little doubt that the abolition of
the immunities was justiﬁed. The prior existence of a certain type of a
relationship or the relative youthfulness of the accused should not mean that
‘3 Callinan 8., ‘Jury of her peers.’, Legal Services Bulletin August 1984, p. I66.
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the law assumes such acts are consensual, or impossible.“ The expanded
deﬁnition of sexual intercourse predictably resulted in a wider range of acts
charged under the 1981 amendments.
 
TABLE 7
The Physical Circumstances
cases heard cases heard
under the Lll‘lC/C’I' the
Typos QI'I’c‘uelratim-z 198] .Almmtdmcms previous law
N. 0/o N. 0/0
Penis/Vagina .................. 94 50.5 118 81.4
Penis/Anus .................... l l 6.0 0
Penis/Mouth .................. 19 10.2 0 . .
Tongue/Vagina ................. 4 2.2 l 0.06
Finger/Vagina ................. , 6 3.2 l 0.06
No penetration ................ _52 27.9 _2_5_ 17.2
Total ......................... 186 100.0 145 100.0
 
Table 7 shows that acts other than the common law acts of penis/vagina
penetration accounted for 21.6 per cent of charges under categories 1 to 3 or
attempt under the 1981 amendments.
Again. there can be little doubt that the seriousness of the violation is more
appropriately reflected in the law by the widening of the deﬁnition. The effect
of the replacement of the single offence of rape with a series of sexual assault
offences is a complex issue. As stated previously it may have contributed to an
increase in guilty pleas. An increase in the proportion of guilty pleas was also
found in the ﬁrst year 'of operation of the Michigan reforms.45
However sexual assaultsswith actual or threatened violence remain in the
minority. The Bureau study found that 50 per cent of cases heard in the higher
courts under the amendments were charged with sexual assault category 3 (s.
61 1)). Approximately one third of cases were charged for the offences involving
in actual or threatened violence. (s. 618 and 5. 61C : 31.8%). Thus the single
largest category of sexual assault offences remains sexual intercourse without
consent where actual violence or threat with a weapon is alleged.
4‘ ('tmliﬂ’e proposes many problems which technically may arise with the abolition of rape the
immunity relating to rape in marriage. None have yet eventuated. He also argues that it is not
enough for prosecutorial discretion to weed out cases which may be technical assaults under the
law. He argues that this should be accomplished by the statute. This ignores the role played by
discretion at all levels in the criminal justice system. The victims ‘discrction‘ to regard the act
as an ollence and complain. the discretion at committal. during the course of the trial. sentencing
discretion and the discretionary choices underlying all ‘judge made‘ laws. ,
("while 1.. ‘('onsent and Sexual Offences Law Reform in N.S.W.' ('rimiHa/‘Lan‘./0ur/i(1/.1984.
8. p. 171.
‘5 Dreisig up. til. (.\'('1‘ footnote 3]).
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The New South Wales amendments have been criticised as emphasizing
the violence of the assault at the expense of other equally serious aggravating
factors. The Nafﬁn report points out that there other equally serious factors in
aggravation. These include the number of offenders (the pack rape), the age of
the victim, and circumstances of gross humiliationﬂ6 The difﬁculty faced in such
‘ﬁne tuning’ of the law is that there is not a simple one to one correspondence
between liability. punishment and damage to the victim. The criminal law
although recognising the harm suffered by the victim as a relevant consideration
in attaching blame and punishment, must of necessity also consider other
factors: the moral culpability of the accused, his state of mind, the need for
both deterrence and rehabilitation, the community standards and the protection
of the public
In many ways the pack ape clearly demonstrates the tension between these
various considerations. The pack rape is a horrendous experience for the victim
and the damage suffered is often great, both physically and psychologically. On
the other hand the culpability ofthe accused is in many ways less than that of
the planned, single sexual assault. Research studies show that pack rapes often
involve younger offenders who may not pre-meditate the offence but whose
judgment is affected by the situation and the peer group pressure.“7
Whilst such factors do not excuse the behaviour or suggest exemption from
liability and punishment, the culpability of the accused for the act of pack rape
may be less than that of the pre-meditated and deliberate act ofa single rapist.
At the present time such factors are taken into account at sentence, where the
judge has a wide discretion to weigh all the circumstances.
The question posed often by Nafﬁn and other commentators is whether
factors other than violence should be isolated to form the basis of a separate
offence' with an increased penalty or should such factors remain for
consideration in the “melting pot’ of the sentencing process? Empirical evidence
on whether factors such as the pack rape are adequately taken into account in
sentencing would assist in the resolution of this issue.
The introduction of a series of sexual assaults of varying degree of
seriousness has also been accompanied by a debate on the proper relationship
‘ between the offences. In a given set of circumstances, do the categories of sexual
assault represent ‘a mutually exclusive ladder of offencesrequiring a choice to
be made as to which offence is appropriate? Or do they represent a non-
exclusive, complementary set of offences such that in cases involving sexual
intercourse without consent the basic offence of s. 61D may be accompanied by
either s. 613 or (‘ according to the harm inﬂicted or threatened?
This issue was settled in Smith '5‘“ case where it was held that the offences
involving actual or threatened violence are additional offences. cumulative upon
5. 61D. 11 was further held that in sentencing for an offence under s. 618 or
s. 6|C it would not be open for a judge to hold against the offender that he had:
4" Nafﬁn.. 0/). oil.
‘7 Woods G. D. Some Statistics relating to indivual & pack rape’. Plowedings ofthe Inslimtc of
Criminologt'. Au. 6. Sewal Offences Against Females (I969 N. S.W. Government Printer). pp.
9—26.
4" R v Smilh (1982) 2 N.S.W. Law Reports p. 569.
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also committed an offence under s. 61D un
less speciﬁcally charged and
convicted. The decision has been interprete
d as a direction that where there is
evidence of sexual intercourse without cons
ent as well as injuries, category 3
should be charged as well as category 1 or 2.“9
The decision has also been criticized in so far
as it denies the judge in
sentencing a category 1 or 2 offence the di
scretion to punish more severely a
completed act of intercourse unless charged.50 Su
ch a criticism fails to recognise
that the maximum penalties for the offences i
nvolving actual or threatened
violence were set at a substantially higher level t
han sexual intercourse without
consent.
Although arising out of the one set of circumstanc
es, the presence of the
violence or threats elevates the offence to a more
serious category with a higher
maximum penalty. The creation of separate o
ffences out of the individual
components in a single set ,of circumstances a
nd the practice of separately
charging each should not be undertaken lightly. In
Australia sentences are most
often concurrent but cumulative sentences are fre
quently handed down in other
jurisdictions.
-
The potential for difficulties in this area was envi
saged by the legislature
in the 1981 amendments. s 442A provides
that if a person is convicted under
s. 618 and 61C or s. 610 the judge should take i
nto account the fact that they
arose substantially out of the one set of circumsta
nces. The relationship between
the basic offence of sexual intercourse without con
sent and the ‘violent offences’
(s. 613 and C) is an issue worthy of further study.
There has also been a debate surrounding those ref
orms such as New South
Wales, which have emphasised the violen
t at the expense of the sexual
component. Many commentators have criticised
the changed emphasis, quite
properly stressing that it is the lack of consent
which deﬁnes the act of rape
irrespective of whether and how much violence is
inﬂicted.5| In practice neither
New South Wales nor Michigan have eliminat
ed the sexual component or
removed ‘consent’ from the law. At the mos
t, violence, may be viewed as an
aggravating factor which-elevates the maximu
m available penalty in both
jurisdictions.
The Areas Not Tackled by the New South Wa
les Reforms
Three contentious areas that the New South
Wales reforms did not modify
in any substantial way were the areas of consent,
the mental element and the
unsworn statement
1. Consent
The most commonly charged offence under
the 1981 amendments is 5.6 1 D,
sexual intercourse without consent. Absence of c
onsent is an ingredient of the
offence and the common law principles supp
lement the amendments contained
 
‘9 Cunliffc. op. cit.
5“ N.S.W. Sexual Assault Committee. Proposalfor review.
1986.
5' Wilson. op. cit (see footnote 15)
Dumaresq. op. cit.
Nafﬁn. op. cit.
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in s. 610 (3) (a) concerning the vitiation of consent by threats of terror and
mistake. The problem of consent is an especially diﬂicult one for the law. It
requires a judgment to be made of the state of mind of the victim immediately
before the sexual act: was she merely acquiescing or submitting because of force,
fear, fraud, threat or some other serious pressure.
..... the dividing line in such circumstances between real consent on the
one hand and mere submission on the other may not be easy to draw.52
The New South Wales amendments did not greatly extend the range of
circumstances or pressures sufﬁcient to negative consent. Threats or terror have
been generally interpreted as threats of physical violence. The amendments
extended such threats to third parties. Under 5. 61D (3) (a) (1) mistaken belief
as to the identity of the person vitiates consent. This largely restates the
common law. The common law is extended in s. 61D (3) (a) (2): the
Papadimitropoulos situation mistake as to the fact of marriage is sufﬁcient to
vitiate consents“
There has been considerable debate on theissue of consent. On the one
hand many commentators have argued that ‘without consent’ should be
restricted to situations where consent is obtained by fraud or threats of force.
On the other hand, there has been an increasing call for the law to recognise
that freedom of choice must be protected by recognising other forms of coercion
which preclude effective consent. 4
The arguments for retaining the existing restrictions are that further
extension would make the law too ‘vague’,53 ‘broaden the law to an unacceptable
degree’54 and that the law should be conﬁned to the situation where the ‘sexual
choiceis eliminated’ and not extended to where the choice may be merely
‘unpalatable’.55
The arguments for an extension of the circumstances which vitiate consent
point to the fact that there are many different types of sexual coercion, but only
a limited few are punished.“ Physical coercion may not be the most harmful
to the victim. Burgess & Holstrom presented an empirically derived typology
of rape which illustrates the wide range of situations where consent is vitiated
by coercion of different kinds.57 Furthermore it is argued that the existing limits
as to what constitutes coercion are artiﬁcial and unjustiﬁed and do not
adequately protect freedom of sexual choice.
Statutory reforms to the common law have adopted a number of different
approaches. The Michigan reforms and the New South Wales reforms tackled
the problem by eliminating consent as an element of the offence. In both cases,
however, consent emerged in other ways. In Michigan it is available as a defence
52 Law Reform Commission of Victoria p. 12.
52" Papadimitropoulos v R (I957) 98 C.L.R. 249.
53 Howard C., Criminal Law, Law Book Co., 1982.
5‘ Criminal Law Revision Committee, Fifteenth Report, op. cit.
55 Tempkin 1., ‘Towards a Modern Law of Rape’ (1982) 45 Modern Law Review, p.' 406.
56 Clark L. M. G. & Lewis D. J., Rape: The Price of Coercive Sexuality. The Women’s Press,
Toronto, 1977.
‘7 Burgess A & Holstrom I... ‘Rape Trauma Syndrome.‘ American Journal QfPsychiaIry, 1974, 9 p.
98I.  
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to the accused.58 In New South Wales consent is not an
element of the offence
in Sexual Assault categories 1 and 2 but remains an element of s
. 610, the most
common sexual assault offence.S9
Another approach has been to specify in the statute
the circumstances
which vitiate consent. The New South Wales amendm
ents also adopted this
approach in a limited way by listing a small non-exhaustive se
t of circumstances.
A more detailed list Was suggested by Naﬂin in South
Australia. A further
approach characterised by the provision of a broad, gen
eral list of circumstances
has been adopted in Tasmania, Western Australia and
Canada. All preserve the
reference to force, threats, and fraud as negativing consent.
The generality of the statutory forms in the latter ref
orms appears likely
to result in the courts recognizing a wider range of c
ircumstances capable of
negativing consent.60 Whether this has happened
is not clear at this point. It
has also been suggested that the reforms may have
the undesirable effect of ’
putting more scrutiny on victims and their motivation
than the common law.6|
The Victorian Law Reform Commission recently came down
in favour of
the general approach. They cited the Western Australian
approach as a suitable
starting point where consent is defined as free an
d voluntary and the
circumstances capable of vitiating consent are lis
ted as ‘force, threat,
intimidatiOn, deception or fraudulent means’.62 The V
ictorian Law Reform
Commission would add to this list ‘coercion and haras
sment’.
The interpretation and operation of these sta
tutory forms is yet to be
observed but may result in either:
— the law of rape being extended to cover situat
ions where a false
promise of a fur coat is made;63
_
—.absolutely-no change because the courts con
tinue to apply the
restrictive common law principles.
It is to be hoped that the actual interpretation will fa
ll somewhere between
these extremes. Both the case for law reform a
nd the direction for reform
requires further study.
u
 
5" Marsh .1. C., Geist A., & Caplan N. Rape & The L
imits ofLaw Reform, Autumn House, Boston,
I982. ‘
5" Some commentators argue that consent may still
be relevant in sexual assault categories I & 2:
Cunliffe op. cit. _
,
6" On the other hand Scutt argues that the genera
l provisions do not go as far as the N.S.W.
provisions: Scutt .l. A., ‘Sexual Assault and the
Australian Criminal Justice System’ in Chappell
D. & Wilson P. The Australian Criminal Justice Syste
m, Butterworth, 1986, p. 57.
' CunlifTe. op. cit.
‘31 s. 8 Amendment (Sexual Assaults) Act, I985.
6’ Cunliﬁ‘e op cit.
o
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2. The Mental Element
There has been extensive debate concerning the subjective test of belief of
consent.“ Morgan’s case re-aﬂirmed the subjective test: an honest belief in
consent on the part of the accused does not satisfy the requirements for criminal
liability. Those who favour an objective test argue that the belief should also
be based on reasonable grounds."’5
The debate is thus a classic one about a key philosophical aspect of
the criminal law.66
The criminal law over many centuries has moved in emphasis. from a
concern with the external act to a primary concern with the mind of the
accused. ‘57 Murder and manslaughter provide one of the most clear examples
of these developments in legal doctrine: an increasing concern to restrict the
responsibility for murder to the narrowest most subjectively responsible, morally
blameworthy state of mind.‘>8 The contemporary legal doctrine of mens rea is
based on the assumption that that a blameworthy state of mind is required.69
The criminal law assumes that people have the power to choose whether to do
criminal acts or not, and that the few who choose to do such an act are
responsible for the resulting evil.70
The call for an objective or reasonable test of belief in consent is thus a
call for a fundamental change in principles.7| The arguments for such a change
are concerned with the role of the law in ensuringthat proper care is taken in
establishing that a person is consenting to sexual intercourse and in protecting
sexual choice.72 The standard of care should be reasonable and the effect of the
change would be to create ‘greater explicitness in sexual contexts’.73
Another argument has been put by Naﬂin: the mental element requirements
are responsible for the low conviction rate in rape trials. No empirical evidence
is provided for this assertion and it may be questioned whether such a
fundamental change is justiﬁed on these grounds alone.74
I
6‘ D. P. P. v Morgan and Others op. cit. (see footnote 3)
65 There has also been a debate on subjective foresight in recklessness. See:
Goode M.. ‘The Mental Element of Rape, the Nafﬁn report and Other Questions: A defence of
the Common Law.’ Criminal Law Journal, 1985, 9, p. 17.
5" Law Reform Commission of Victoria op. cit. p. 33.
“7 Wells op. cit. (see footnote )4) disputes that the subjective principle of mens rea actually accords
with criminal culpability and queries whether it is always desirable.
6" Dixon 0.. ‘The Development of the Law of Homicide’ 1935—36’, 9 Australian Law Journal
Supplement. p. 64.
6" Smith .I. C.. & Hogan 8., Criminal Law., London Butterworth, I983.
7‘ Smith & Hogan.
7 Cowley D.. ‘The Retreat from Morgan’, Crim. L. R. 1982, p. I98.
Report of the Advisory Group on the Law of Rape. op. cit. (see footnote 14).
72 Tempkin J.. ‘The Limits of Reckless Rape], Crim. LR. 1983, p. 5. "
Wells op. cit. 1
73 Pickard op. cit. (see footnote l4) p. 77.
7‘ Sutton disputes these assertions on empirical grounds
Sutton A. & Koschnistcky N. ‘The Case for Empirical studies, Legal Services Bulletin, 1984, 9
p. I62.
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Reform proposals suggestedby Nafﬁn involve a shifting of the onus of
proof in various ways from the Crown to the accused. Describing her most
radical proposal which would create an afﬁrmative defence. of honest and
reasonable mistake, Nafﬁn states:
Not only does it require the accused to give an account of himself
and convince the jury of his belief in consent, but it also obliges him
to persuade the jury of the reasonableness of that belief.75
This proposal goes much further than the other reform proposals and
clearly offends some of the fundamental principles of the criminal law?" At the
very least all the reform proposals are concerned with the establishment of an
offence of rape by negligence. Opposition to such changes has been as vocal and
entrenched as the calls for change77 and as yet none of the common law
jurisdictions in Australia. or England has moved in this direction. New Zealand
has recently introduced a reasonableness requirement. The code states of
Queensland. Tasmania and Western Australia require that the defence of honest
mistake be reasonable.
It has been suggested by Cowley that some of the concern with the
subjective test arises from the misapprehension that the accused only has to
make a bald assertion of belief rather than adduce evidence of a reasonable
belief.7x In practice, the evidentiary burden imposed by the subjective test
requires the accused to adduce some reasonable evidence of belief, although the
belief is not required to be reasonable. '
This evidentiary requirement has a statutory footing in England.
Consideration should pierhaps be given to amending the New South Wales
provisions along the lines of the English provision to clarify this requirement.
3. The L'Iisimru Statement
A ﬁnal issue of public concern has been that of the unsworn statement.
The arguments underlying the calls for abolition of the unsworn statement are
summarised by Scutt:
Women's groups . . . complain that the victim witness in such a
case is subjected to rigorous cross-examination often ofa probing kind
designed to destroy the women‘s credibility and standing. whilst the
defendant is free to make whatever statements he chooses without fear
of cross-examination. Women‘s groups complain that the character of
the victim witness can be besmirched by the defendant in his unsworn
statement. yet his character is not called into question.”
’-‘ Nallin. up. ('il.. p. 49.
“' (iootle. 0/). t'il. (see footnote 65).
"V Smith. J. (‘.. ‘Retliinking the Defence of Mislakc‘. ().\‘. ._/.I...S‘.. I983. 2. p. 42‘).
Williams. (3.. 'Recklcssncss Redeﬁned.~ ('.I.../. l98'l. 40. p. 252.
(Bootlt‘. up. t/I.
Rmal (‘ommission on Human Relationships. l’ii/u/ Report (l977) —\.(i.l’.S.. ('anherra.
7” (fowle). up. ('fl.
’" Law Reform Commission of Victoria. Rv/mrl .v\'u. .7. (fl/\‘ii'uru Sid/(’IIN’III i/i ("rim/Hal
‘l'riu/A'.
September I985. Minority report presented b_\ Scull. .l. .—\.. p. 38.
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Retention of the unsworn statement, with or without modiﬁcation has been
supported. on the other hand. by others. The Victorian Law Reform
Commission, the Australian Law Reform Commission and the New South
Wales Law Reform Commission have recently recommended retention.
The arguments in favour of retention point out that the majority of
criminal defendants are from educationally and economically deprived
backgrounds. Such people are seriously disadvantaged in the criminal trial and
may be ‘unable to do themselves any justice if cross—examined.”‘" The unsworn
statement enables them to take part in the trial without the risk of prejudice
and injustice. Furthermore the claims that the right is unfair because it applies
only to the accused do not adequately consider the fact that the accused is the
only person liable to suffer conviction and punishment.
The ‘unfairness’ ground was tackled by the University of New South Wales
law teachers in their submission to the New South Wales Law Reform
Commission."| They point out that debate on the appropriate balance between
defence and prosecution is not very helpful and in any case the balance is not
in favour of the accused.
Criminal justice in principle places the onus of proof on the
prosecution and provides the accused with the right to a trial and a
presumption of innocence. But it operates in practice on the
assumption that for the vast majority these rights must be merely
empty rhetoric."2 ‘
\
The law teachers maintain that the right to make an unsworn statement is
one of the very few genuine rights enjoyed by the criminal defendant. They
recommend however that the restrictions on.the mention of prior sexual
behaviour imposed by s. 490C on the unsworn statement are appropriate and
should be strictly enforced by the courts. An interesting point made by these
authors and not sufficiently explored in any of the reform proposals on the
unsworn statement is that the real ‘problems’ are the current rules of evidence
and the question and answer method of eliciting of in-court evidence which
distort or preclude the accurate recall or reporting of events. The unsworn
statement represents the only opportunity in the criminal trial for defendants
to 'tell their own story in their own words‘. It represents the only opportunity
for an accused to directly participate in his own defence.
If such a procedure is felt to be unfair to victims of sexual assault then
perhaps the direction for the future should be to consider ways in which the
victim may have a similar opportunity, rather than deprive accused persons of
the right. Consideration should also be given to more carefully regulating the
type of statements made in the unsworn statement.
"" Law Reform Commission of Victoria, ibid, p. 22.
"' Law Teachers. University of N.S.W. Law School. L'nsu'orn Slalelnenl u_/'.~lccnset/ Persons.
Unpublished submission to N.S.W. Law Reform Commission. August. 1985.
"3 McBarnet. D.. Conviction. MacMillan. London. I981. p. 78.
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Scutt questioned whether the abolitio
n of the unsworn statement would
make any difference to the concerns‘raise
d by women’s groups.83 Abolition of
the unsworn statement does not mean
that the accused will be cross-examine
d:
He may remain silent while the woma
n victim continues to be I
harshly treated through cross-examination.
Scutt points that stringent and destructiv
e cross-examination selectively
disadvantages people in certain cate
gories (women, blacks, people of no
n-
English speaking backgrounds) irrespe
ctive of whether they are the victim o
r
the accused. The restrictions impos
ed in s. 4903 may thus represent
an
important ﬁrst step in tackling the pro
blems described in the cross-examinat
ion
of witnesses. .-
The existing restrictions on the unsworn
statement in New South Wales
also address some of the concerns o
f the critics. Section 4908 & C prohi
bit
mention of the victim’s prior sexual beh
aviour in both evidence and the
unsworn statement. If the accused raises
his own character in the unsworn
statement then the prosecuting authoritie
s are able to tender evidence of
character.84 In the Bureau study there wer
e examples of where the defendant
clearly contributed to his own conviction by
raising his character in the unsworn
statement. The prosecuting authorities we
re permitted to tender antecedents
which included prior convictions for se
xual assault.85
The difﬁculty faced in reform proposals is
how to preserve and extend the
opportunity provided by the unswor
n statement for the parties to “tell
their
story in their Own words” without the ar
tiﬁcial restraints imposed by the legal
process, whilst at the same time using t
he legal rules to restrict the possible
abuses.
Conclusion -
In conclusion, some general themes see
m to emerge from this review of
rape law reform.
'
Firstly, although the New South Wal
es reforms have been successful in
tackling many of the problems iden
tiﬁed in the vast literature on rape,
there
are still areas where previously identiﬁed
problems continue and new problems
have emerged. This suggests that law ref
orm is not a ‘once and for all’ exercise.
There is a demonstrated need for contin
ued vigilance in the monitoring of the
operation of the law.
Secondly, the underlying theme of much
rape law reform is the challenge
being made to the repressive and pas
sive views of female sexuality repro
duced
in the discourse on rape.86 Althoug
h the reform proposals reviewed i
n the
present paper raise many diverse a
nd technical legal problems, the pr
imary
objective of the reforms has been to cha
nge the way in which the law deﬁnes
and responds to the rape victim. Fe
male sexuality as reproduced in the
rape
.
.
 
‘43 Scutt. op. cit. (see footnote 60).
‘ R. v. SIa/der (1981) 2, N.S.W. Law Report
s, p. 9.
”5 Bureau of Crime Statistics and R
esearch personal communication.
.
3" Dumaresq, op. cit. (see footnote 22).
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trial is passive and chaste. The law in many ways denies female sexuality. The
victim is required to either conform to this ideal or be classiﬁed as an agent
provocateur: a seductress, a prostitute, or an hysterical or vengeful false
accuser.87 The concern of the women’s movement has been to challenge these
boundaries of permissible sexual behaviour and to restore to women control
over their own sexuality.88 ‘
[Rape] is a violation of a woman’s autonomy and a negation of
her independence.89
Traditionally, the law of rape has operated in a way which has reinforced
the negation of a woman’s autonomy and independence in the sexual sphere.
Finally, the limits of law reform should be recognised. The law does not
exist in a cultural and political vacuum. The legal construction of the rapist
and the rape victim actively draws upon broader community attitudes and
stereotypes. Transformation of attitudes and the relations between men and
women requires broad economic and social changes in society.90
The legal system we have expresses the class-divided, racist and
sexist nature of our society, and campaigns to change the law, while
valuable and indeed essential, have to recognise that the system is
unlikely to be radically altered until society as a whole changes.“
 
97 Edwards, op. cit. (see footnote 15).
3“ Dumaresq, op. cit.
8" Wilson, op. cit, p. 78 (see footnote 15).
9° Weekes, J., Sexuality, Ellis Horwood, I986.
Coward, R., Patriarchal Precedent; Routledge & Keegan, 1983.
9' Wilson, op. cit.. p. 229.
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CHILD SEXUAL ASSAULT—LAW REFORM PAST AND
FUTURE
Paul Byrne,
Commissioner,
New South Wales Law Reform Commission
The History Prior to 1984
It is not so long ago that the plight of abused child
ren was absolutely
ignored. It has been said that the first recorded case of child abu
se in the United
. States of America in which ofﬁcial action was taken to
help a child victim
occurred in New York in 1874. A young girl who had been regu
larly mistreated
by her parents was removed from her home after a g
roup of church workers
successfully intervened on her behalf by appealing to
the Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.‘ In the area of sexual a
ssault of children,
much progress has been made and particularly in the very
recent past. The
conclusion of this paper is that there is a great deal more that c
an be done, but
that this is an area in which our legislators should tread very
carefully.
When the first New South Wales Crimes Act was
drafted in 1883, it
contained relatively few specific provisions relati
ng to sexual offences against
' children.2 It was an offence punishable by death to hav
e carnal knowledge {of a
female under the age of 10 years.3 Carnal knowledge with a
female aged between
10 and 14 was punishable by a maximum of penal serv
itude for 10 years. It
was also expressly provided that offences of carnal
knowledge committed by a
schoolmaster or a father against a female under the
age of 16 would be
punishable by a maximum of penal servitude for 14 ye
ars. The other relevant
section provided that indecent assaults upon a girl unde
r the age of 14 years
would be punishable by a maximum penalty of penal servit
ude for five years.
It was not until 1924 that the specific offence of incest
was established by
the Crimes Act.4 At the same. time, the age at which c
onsent became relevant
in those offences mentioned above was raised from 14
years to 16 years. It is
also important to note that it was not until 1974 th
at a provision was introduced
into the Crimes Act5 making it an offence punishab
le by a maximum of
imprisonment for two years to commit an act of i
ndecency with a female under
the age of 16 years. A similar provision relating to
offences committed with
males had been established in 1955.6
 
' T. M. Lewis, Commissioner of Police (Qld) ‘Child Abus
e: ls Police Involvement Necessary’ (1985)
Australian Crime Prevention Council, Vol. 7. No. '5, p. 3.
~
2 (1883) 46 Victoria No. 17, ss. 41—44.
3 (1883) 47 Victoria No. 17, s. 41. See later Crimes
Act I900, s. 67 as. amended by Crimes
(Amendment) Act 1955.
‘ Crimes Act 1900 5. 78A.
_
5 Crimes Act 1900 s. 76A, repealed and replaced by C
rimes Act 1900 s. 615(2).
6 Crimes AC! 1900 s. 8|A.
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There are some important rules of criminal procedure which must also be
taken into account in order to get a complete picture of the approach taken to
the prosecution of child sexual assault cases before the recent amendments:
* The rules providing for the evidence of children to be received under
oath were restrictive and concentrated on the child’s appreciation
that telling lies would be punished by divine retribution.7
* The law provided that a trial judge must give the jury a speciﬁc
warning about the danger of convicting where there is no
corroboration of a complaint of sexual assault. It also required that
a similar warning be given in relation to the evidence of children.
Where the case involved an allegation by a child of a sexual offence,
the warning was therefore required on two grounds. Indeed, the
Crimes Act expressly provided that there could not be a conviction
for a sexual offence based on unsworn evidence of a child unless
there was some corroboration.8
There is no suggestion that any special procedures were used in the
prosecution of offences involving the sexual abuse of children. As recently as
1969 the late Sir Harold Snelling, Q.C., then Solicitor—General, made the point
that the procedure involved in prosecuting the charge of a sexual offence ,
committed against a young person, should be altered in an attempt to avoid
and minimise the traumatic consequences for the child. He observed that
because of the absence of corroboration of the child’s story, it would often
happen that the jury would either be directed to acquit or having received the
usual warning, would be ‘virtually certain‘ to acquit. Even if there was a
conviction, because many cases involved people who have previous good
character, they would be ‘virtually certain’ to receive a bond from the sentencing ‘
judge. He also noted that some offences of this nature are committed by persons
who are mentally ill.9 These factors probably contributed to making the area of
child sexual assault one of those in which the discretion to prosecute the case
was often exercised in favour of abandoning the prosecution.
In 1977 the Royal Commission on Human Relationships recommended,
amongst other things, that the procedure in child sexual assault cases should be
changed by establishing a special tribunal to decide whether or not a criminal
prosecution is desirable in cases of sexual offences involving child victims and
that trial procedures where these cases involve young people should be altered
so as to minimise the risk of occasioning distress to children who are required
to give evidence.'°
The Royal Commission recommended that incest should cease to be an
offence but suggested that where the accused person and his or her partner are
members of the same family, the age of consent for the offences of unlawful
sexual intercourse and indecent assault should be 17. For the purpose of this
rule it was proposed that ‘members of the same family’ should include adoptive
7 See now Oaths (Children) Amendment Act I985.
3 Crimes Act I900 s. 418, repealed by Crimes (Child Assault) Amendment Act 1985 s. 5(6).
9 H. R. Snelling, Q.C., ‘Sexual Offences involving Female Children’ in Proceedings ofthe Institute
QfCrimino/ogv, No. 6, Sexual Offences against Females (N.S.W. Government Printer 1969) pp.
61—69. .
'0 Royal Commission on Human Relationships Report (1977) p. 217.
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parents, guardians, foster—parents, step—pa
rents and de facto husbands and
wives. It was also suggested that where the accuse
d person and his or her partner
are related as brother and sister, the reco
mmended age of consent should not
apply if the age difference between the part
ies is no more than five years.“
In New South Wales no action was taken
to implement the proposals made
by the Royal Commission on Human Relati
onships. The important changes
made in the 1981 legislation, which has
been referred to in detail in another
paper given at this seminar, did not speciﬁcall
y address the special situation of
children and the beneﬁt of these reform
s was not extended to child sexual
assault cases.
There followed two important reports in the
United Kingdom which
canvassed the question of whether the law rela
ting to sexual assaults against
children should be extended to cover offences com
mitted by people in a position
of authority. The Scottish Law Commission re
commended in 1981 that if any .
person over the age of 16 is in a position of tru
st or authority in relation to a
child under the age of 16 and is a member of th
e same household, it should be
an offence for that person to have sexual interc
ourse with the child.‘2
In ,1984 the Criminal Law Revision Committee in
England recommended
that there should be a separate offence of unla
wful sexual intercourse with a
Stepchild created but recommended against a m
ore general offence of unlawful
sexual intercourse between a child and
a person in a position of trust or
authority.‘3 A further important aspect of
the Committee’s recommendations
was that prosecution for offences in the na
ture of incest should be conditional
upon obtaining the consent of the Director of Pu
blic Prosecutions.” This feature
of prosecutions for offences of incest had already
been established in New South
Wales at the time the offence was introduced i
n 1924.15
The Criminal Law Revision Committe
e maintained that the primary
reason for retaining the offence of incest is fo
r the protection of the young and
vulnerable against sexual exploitation. The C
ommittee argued that apart from
the impact upon the individual victim,
one of the harmful consequences of
incest was the violation of the role of the fam
ily.
A child who suffers abuse at the hand
of a stranger can expect
comfort and protection from his or her fa
mily; incest victims often
have no one to whom to turn. Those wh
o should support have been
the cause of the suffering.16
 
" ibid
‘ ‘3 Scotland. Law Commission ‘The Law of Incest
in Scotland‘ (Cmnd 8422) (HMSO Edinburgh,
l98l). :
‘
'3 Criminal Law Revision Committee 15th Repo
rt: Sexual Oﬂcnces (H.M.S.O., London, 1984).
'4 ibid.
'
'5 Crimes Act 1900, s. 781:. See also Crimes Act
I900, s. 78T (2) relating to homosexual offences
.
"’ Criminal Law Revision Committee, note
13 at p. 66.
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Fisse has criticised the Criminal Law Revision Committee’s proposals on
the scope and deﬁnition of incest related offences.l7 He pomts to three major
shortcomings:
1. the range of relationships covered is not sufﬁciently wide to give
full protection to all children at risk of sexual abuse from adults
in a position of authority or control over them;
2. the age of consent for brother-sister incest is, at 21, high; and
3. the range of incestuous conduct proscribed is conﬁned to sexual
intercourse yet other forms of sexual conduct can also be the
subject of serious abuse or exploitation.
In New South Wales, the law and proCedure regarding the prosecution of
child sexual assault cases had been unchanged for many years. Landmark
reforms had been implemented in the area of sexual assaults involving adults.
Various proposals for reform had been made, both here and overseas, but none
had been acted upon.
It was against this background that the New South Wales Government
Task Force on Child Sexual Assault was established by the Premier, Mr Neville
-Wran, QC, on 25 June 1984.
1984-1985: The Work of the Task Force
The terms of reference given to the Child Sexual Assault Task Force
required it, amongst the things, to: ‘
(iv) Examine N.S.W. laws relevant to the sexual as’sault of children
and make appropriate recommendations consistent with the
maintenance of the existing rights of suspects and accused
persons relating to—
(a) reporting of child sexual assault; .
(b) investigative procedures upon reporting of child sexual
assault;
(c) the substantive and procedural law relating to prosecution,
trial and disposition of cases of child sexual assault.
The Task Force met a number of times to determine the areas of concern
which its report would examine and in respect of which it intended to make
recommendations. So far as its work on the law and legal procedures was
concerned, the Task Force concentrated its attention upon-the following topics:
‘* mandatory reporting of suspected cases of sexual assault;
* the conduct of medical examinations and the need for the
consent of the child;
* the right of private citizens to launch a criminal prosecution for
the sexual assault of children;
 
'7 B. Fissc ‘lnccst: A Critique of the English Criminal Law Revision Committee’s 15th Report
(l984)‘ in Proceedings ofI/m Inslitulr ofCrimino/ogv, No. 6], Incest (N.S.W. Government Printer.
I984). p. | I.
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* the discretion to prosecute offences of child sexual assault and
the respective roles of agencies such as the police, the Crown law
authorities, the Department of Youth and Community Services
and other agencies representing the interests of the alleged victim;
* the need for specially qualiﬁed prosecutors to conduct child
sexual assault prosecutions; ‘
* the use of electronic equipment to record statements made by
children alleged to be victims of sexual assault;
the use of electronic recordings in court proceedings;
priority in the listing of cases;
the venue of trials and of committal proceedings;
the courtroom environment and in particular the question of
whether the accused person and his or her alleged victim should
be separated;
education of children as to court procedures;
making sure that victims are aware of their rights;
conducting proceedings in closed court;
the use of a “support person” to accompany the alleged victim
in court; .
* prohibition against publication 'of information which would
identify the victim; .
* the compellability of a spouse to give evidence in the trial of his
or her spouse;
* the law relating to the taking of an oath or afﬁrmation by a child
witness; -
* corroboration of the evidence of a child;
* evidence of prior sexual experience and reputation;
* warnings to the jury regarding delay in the making of a
complaint;
* the categories of offences;
* alternatives to the criminal justice system for the prosecution of
cases of child sexual assault.
*
*
‘l
*
*
4!-
*
*
A community consultation paper publicly released in September 1984 and
a vast range of submissions was received. The submissions came from
organisations with ﬁrsthand experience of the facts of child sexual assault from
the four perspectives with which the Task Force was primarily concerned.
Firstly, community education, secondly, services and procedures for victims,
thirdly, training of personnel and, fourthly, law and legal procedures. Additional
conferences were held with representatives of many of the organisations who
made submissions. ‘
In the area of .law and procedure related to child sexual assault, the
following were involved in conferences with members of the Task Force:
* Sir Laurence Street, Chief Justice of New South Wales and his
Honour Judge Staunton, C.B.E., Q.C., Chief Judge of the District
Court;
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*
*
Crown Prosecutors and' ofﬁcers of the Solicitor for Public
Prosecutions;
Public Defenders and officers of the Legal Aid Commission of New
South Wales;
* representatives of both branches of the legal profession through the
Law Society and the Bar Association.
The objectives of the Task Force could be broadly summarised to include
the following:
* bearing in mind the apparent gross under reporting of sexual offences
involving children, to increase the incidence of reporting;
to increase public awareness, including the awareness of potential
child victims, of the crime of child sexual assault with a view to its
prevention; .
to increase, and improve the standard of, the assistance available to
victims of child sexual assault, including the provision of support and
counselling;
to co-ordinate the work of the various agencies involved in this area
in order to develop a consistent policy with emphasis on the needs
and interests of the child; -
to improve the procedures followed in the investigation and
prosecution of offences of child sexual assault.
The report of the Task Force was published in March 1985 and among its
65 recommendations were 23 which proposed amendments to the relevant law
and procedure. So far as I am aware, all but one of these recommendations has
been acted upon although not all have been implemented at the time of
preparing this paper. The most important step in the implementation of the
Task Force recommendations was taken on 12 November 1985 when a series
of five separate items of legislation was introduced into the Parliament. The
outstanding features of the legislation are:
1. Crimes (Child Assault) Amendment Act
* The Act introduces a new range of sexual offences against children
which, with one notable exception, apply equally to make and female
children.'8
* The Act generally abandons the use of the term carnal knowledge for
' offences involving children and replaces it with the deﬁnition of
‘sexual intercourse’ introduced by the 1981 amendments, that is to
include acts of oral sexual connection and digital penetration.‘9
The Act introduces the concept of ‘a person in authority’ and provides
that where an offence is committed by such a person against a child
then the maximum penalty available upon conviction should be, in
some cases, greater than that for offenders who do not have such a
relationship with the victim.20
”‘ scc ‘Homoscxual Anomalies‘ at 32—33 below.
'9 Crimes Jul I900 5. 61A.
3“ (Ti/1105.401 l900 5. 61A (5): 6|D(|A) and 615 (1A) and (2A).
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* The Act abolishes the previous requirement that an accused person
could not be convicted on the unsworn evidence of a child without
some evidence corroborating that testimony.“
* The Act brings sexual offences involving children into line with
offences involving adults by providing ﬁrstly, that a trial judge may
give the jury a direction that the fact that a complaint is not made
for some time after the offence does not of itself suggest that the
complaint is false and secondly, that there should be restrictions upon
examination of a child regarding his or her prior sexual echrience.22
* The Act provides that a spouse is, subject to some minor exceptions,
made a compellable witness in the trial of his or her spouse on a
charge of assaulting a child, either sexually or otherwise.23
* Under the Act, the publication of information which may identify a
child involved in a sexual assault case can be prohibited irrespective
of the wishes of the accused person. 2“
* The Act provides that where proceedings are conducted in closed
court, a ‘support person’ should be permitted to be present in the‘
interests of the child.25
This legislation came into force on 23 March 1986.
2. Community Welfare (Child Assault) Amendment Act
* The Act establishes an obligation for various categories of people to
report suspected cases of sexual abuse of children.“5 The Task Froce
recommended that the following groups be included in this category:
- teachers;
- . physiotherapists;
' - counsellors for schools and family courts; ‘
0 child care workers;
‘ - social workers;
- psychologists;
- speech therapists;
. nurses; and
0 police.
3. Oaths (Children) Amendment Act
* This legislation provides that the testimony of a child may be received
in court proceedings where the person authorised to administer the
oath is satisﬁed that the child;
(i) is sufﬁciently intelligent to justify receiving his or her evidence;
(ii) understands the duty of speaking the truth; and the child
promises ‘to tell the truth at all times’.27
 
. 2' The previous requirement was contained in Crimes Act I900 s. 48l. see note 8.
11 Crimes Act 1900 55. 40513, 409A.
13 Crimes Act I900 s. 407AA.
1‘ Crimes Act I900 s. 578.
25 Crimes Act 1900 5 77A.
26 Community Welfare (Child Assault) Amendment Act 1985 s. 4 (l) inserting a new 5.102 in the
principal Act
27 Oaths (Children) Amendment Act I985 s. 3 (2) inserting new ss. 32-35 in the principal Act and
a tenth schedule setting out the form ofthe declaration.
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4. Eridence (Children) Amendment Act
* This legislation provides that the trial judge is not required by any rule
of law or practice to warn the jury-that it is unsafe to convict the
accused person on the uneorroborated evidence ofa child. The trial
judge may. however, give such a waring if it is considered appropriate
in the circumstances of the case.28
 
5. Pie-Trial Diversion ofa/fenders Act
* This legislation establishes a scheme under which a person accused of
~the sexual assault of a child may be permitted to participate jn a
speciﬁed treatment programme instead of being subjected to a
conventional criminal prosecution.
* The decision as to whether an accused person is a suitable candidate for
the pre-trial diversion programme will be made by the authortiy
responsible for the prosecution ofa child sexual assault offences before ‘
the commencement of committal proceedings.
* The availability of the programme is subject to the accused person
pleading guilty at the committal proceedings and adhering to that plea
on his or her appearance before the Supreme Court or the District
Court.”
* It is likely that the availability of the pre-trial diversion programme will
be limited and that those expressly excluded by guidelines to be
formulated will include people who have prior convictions for sexual
assault, people charged with offences against children who are not
previously known to them.30
* The accused person will be required to make an undertaking before the
Supreme Court or the District Court to participate in the treatment
programme but may at any time during the currency of the
programme elect not to continue with it in which case the normal
process of prosecution will be commenced.-‘|
* Where a person accused of a child sexual assault offence complies with
the undertaking made and. the requirements made of him or her by
legislation, no further proceedings shall be taken against that person
in respect of the offence. For all practical purposes the accused person
will avoid having a conviction or sentence recorded.32
ln addition to these legislative enactments, some important administrative
steps have been taken to alleviate the plight of victims of child sexual assault
and to improve the efﬁciency of criminal procedure in this area. The
Department of the Attorney General has adopted a policy of giving priority to
the listing of cases involving charges of child sexual assault second only to that
given to proceedings involving persons in custody.33 This is a signiﬁcant
development. The delays in the hearing of criminal cases, particularly where
3" Iz'rirlmt‘e (Children) ,lnmn/iiie/il .-l('l I985 s. 3 inserting a 5. 42A in the principal Act.
3“ I’I'e-Il‘iu/ Dire/win” iii ()[li'm'ex .l(‘l 1985 5. l7.
5“ New South Wales Child Sexual Assault Task Force Report (I985) at l 17-122.
3' I’M-Iriu/ Dire/”Sim: igl'Ol/ivn/t'lix' . IN 1985 ss. 23. 25.
’3 l’re-Il‘ia/ Direizvimi .‘i/ “(lent/wit .lt‘l l985 ss. 23. 30.
-‘~‘ New South Wales Law Reform Commission Pi'nt'edureﬁ‘om Charge IO Trial: Specific Problems
and l’mpusuir (DP l4/2. I987) para 8.l | at 343.
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the accused person is released on bail, were identiﬁed by the Task Force as being
one of the major factors causing unnecessary and avoidable aggravation to the
victims of child sexual assault.
Intaddition. the prosecution of offences of child sexual assault has been
reorga‘m'sed.“ A separate unit has been established within the ofﬁce of the
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions with the exclusive responsibility for child
sexual assault cases. The practice known as ‘vertical’ prosecution is followed.
This involves the case being conducted by a single ofﬁcer of the Solicitor for
Public Prosecutions virtually from the time the charge is laid. That ofﬁcer will
personally cmidtntet "the prose‘utibtt case at committal proceedings and will
instruct the Crbx‘vn Prosecutor if there is a subsequent trial. The important
reasons for introducing this practice are ﬁrstly that from the point of view of
the child victim. there is one person who is responsible_for the conduct of the
case from me time it is instituted until its conclusion. This enables a
relationship oftrust and conﬁdence to develop. Secondly. involving a specialised
solicitor in the early“stages of the prosecution will mean that the preparation
ofthe case for trial can be accelerated. thereby reducing the time during which
the matter is awaiting hearing in the courts.
The Task Force considered whether the right of a private citizen to
prosecute an offence of chil‘e‘L sexual assault should be preserved. The issue arose
in the course of the very detailed consideration which was given to the
implementation ofa prosecuting policy which would require special precautions
to be taken before such a prosecution could be launched. It was felt that the
agency responsible should be required to take into account the best interests of
the child victim before making the decision to prosecute. At one stage it was
considered that to permit an individual citizen to launch a prosecution would
defeat the purpose ofthe specialist prosecuting agency and run contrary to the
principles on which the recommendation to establish it was based. This idea
was canvassed in the community consultation paper but was met with strong
criticism. Ultimately it was considered that as a matter of principle the right
of the individual citizen to prosecute should be preserved for all criminal cases
and that it was not legitimate to make an exception in the case of child sexual
assault.35 It should be noted, however. that the right of a private citizen to
launch a prosecution for a homosexual offence allegedly involving a person
under 18 is subject to consent of the Attorney General being obtained.36 There
is no equivalent provision for any other offence of child sexual assault.
‘4 I am grateful [0 Megan Latham. Ofﬁcer in Charge. Child Sexual Assault Unit in the Solicitor for
Public Prosecutions for the information contained in this paragraph.
-‘-‘ Ne“ South Wales Law Reform Commission l’rrK'Ur/lll‘t'fi'nlll (Wu/11010 'l‘riul: .‘I General I’m/mull
Iiir Rq/iirm (DP l3. H986) para 8. See also New South Wales Law Reform Commission I’rm'et/m'e
fin/n ('Imtjur' It) 'l'riul: Speciﬁc I'rull/mns‘ um/ I'I'npmu/x (DP H/Z: I987) paras ll. 49-l3. 55 at
535-539: see also Australian Law Reform Commission Slum/iii}: in Public Ill/(‘H'X/ Liligalirm
(ALRC 27. WES) at l83-209.
3" ('riniat :ch I900. s. 78T (2).
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The Current Position
  The current offences and penalties related to child sexual assault are setout below. The term ‘sexual intercourse’ is used in the broad sense deﬁned in
the 1981 legislation.37
TABLE 1
Current Child Sexual Assault Offences ;
Non-Consensual Offences
 
maximum ifperson in
 
age penalty authority
Is. 613 sexual intercourse with GBH . under 18 20 20
5. 61C sexual intercourse with ABH or weapon under 18 12 12
s. 611) sexual intercourse under 18 7 7
s. 610 sexual intercourse under 16 10 12
TABLE 2
Current Child Sexual Assault Offences
Where Consent is Not Relevant
a e maximum ifperson in
. g penalty authority
5. 611-: (1) (IA) indecent assault ' ' under 16 4 6’
s. 615 (2) (2A) act indecency . ' under 16 2 4
5. 66A sexual intercourse child under 10 20 20
5. 66C sexual intercourse child 10 or over 8 10
under 16 '
s. 78H homosexual intercourse child under 10 Life Life
s. 78K homosexual intercourse child 10 or over 10 10
. ‘ under 18
s. 730 teacher father/step-father ‘ . . l6 8 8
5. 78A incest 16 or over 7 7
," under 18
This classiﬁcation of offences is confusing and inconsistent. There are many
instances of various acts being capable ofprosecution under two or sometimes
three different sections. Some offences are drafted too narrowly, others cover
too broad a range of prohibited activities. There is no guidance given to
sentencing judges regarding the factors which should be regarded as aggravating
or mitigating the seriousness of an offence. There is also what some people may
regard as a serious problem arising from the fact that the provisions relating to
homosexual offences differ in important respects from other offences.
The material set out in the previous section largely describes the current
law and procedure relating to child sexual assault. It should be added, however,
that since the 1985 amendments, practitioners experienced in this ﬁeld have
not encountered serious difficulties in the prosecution of these offences which
could be attributed to the changes then made.38 A special division of the
37 Crimes Act 1900 5. 61A. '
3“ see note 34.
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Solicitor for Public Prosecutions has been established and since July 1986 has I
been responsible for the conduct of committal proceedings in child sexual
assault cases. In those cases which can be dealt with by a magistrate in the local
court if the accused person consents to that course, the solicitor will have the
carriage of the matter whilst it is before the court. If the matter is heard in the
higher courts, the solicitor who conducted the committal will continue to be
involved in the case as it proceeds to trial and will instruct a Crown Prosecutor
at the trial itself.
Although the implementation of this scheme has meant that police
prosecutors no longer conduct committal proceedings on behalf of the
prosecution in cases of child sexual assault, the role of the police is naturally
closely linked with that of the prosecutor. In the prosecution of crimes of this
kind the establishment of a specialist unit within the police force, namely, the
Juvenile Services Bureau, and a specialist unit within the Solicitor for Public
Prosecutions, ensures that the relationship between the police and the
prosecuting authority will be a close and continuing one. The prosecuting
authority has adopted a policy of requiring the brief to be given to them no‘
more than 21 days after the accused person has been charged. After examining
the brief, the prosecuting authority is in a position to determine what charges,
if any, should be laid. It can give advice as to the need or desirability for further
evidence to be obtained or for other charges to be laid. The prosecuting
authority has also adopted a policy of serving the trial brief for the prosecution
upon the legal representative of the accused person as soon as it is available.
These developments represent a refreshing approach to making the conduct
of criminal prosecutions in this State more efﬁcient. Where early contact is
made between the investigating police and the prosecuting authority, a more
efﬁcient system of prosecution results. There is consequently far less trauma and
inconvenience for the child victim. A case which has no prospect of success
can be abandoned at a very early stage and cases which might otherwise have
been lost can be maintained through the timely advice provided by the
prosecuting authority. The early disclosure of the prosecution case to the defence
has already resulted in the benefit of reducing the disputes that occur at the
committal proceedings and this has limited the extent of cross-examination to
which a child victim is subjected.
In New. South Wales a child victim is almost always required to give
evidence at the committal proceedings unless the accused person pleads guilty
before the local court.39 The experience of those who are frequently involved
in child sexual assault cases is that the style of cross-examination of lawyers
who represent accused people, not .surprisingly, varies considerably and will
naturally depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. The impression
of one prominent solicitor in this ﬁeld is that since the involvement of the
specialist unit in the Solicitor for Public Prosecutions, there has been a
concerted effort to reduce the degree of hostility and intimidation which has
sometimes been permitted in the past. Similarly, the approach taken by .
magistrates towards controlling hostile and intimidatory cross-examination
varies considerably and no generalisation can safely be made.
3" Justices Act 1902, 5. 51A. See also 5. 48 outlining a system of ‘paper committals’ which
may also relieve the victim of the distress of giving evidence at committal proceedings.
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It should also be remembered that it is a well known and legitimate tactical
approach for a lawyer to take a much harsher (some might say ‘a more
searching’) approach towards a witness at committal proceedings than would
be taken at the actual trial before a jury. In front of the jury there is always the
risk that an attempt to intimidate a witness, particularly a child, will sway the
emotion of the jury in favour of the child and against the cause being promoted
by the defence lawyer.
Steps have already been taken to implement the pre-trial diversion scheme.
A location has been selected and the training of personnel has commenced.
Experience to date suggests that once‘this scheme is fully operational, it will
have an appreciable effect on the number of people accused of offences of this
kind who plead guilty. It is not uncommon, even at this stage, for the Solicitor
for Public Prosecutions to be asked on behalf of accused people whether the
scheme is in operation.
Reforms for the Future
1. Videotaping the Statements of Victims
When a child makes a complaint of sexual assault, the usual procedure involves
the child having to tell a wide range of people of the intimate details of the
assault.40 After making the original complaint, the child may be required to
relate the same version of events to a policeoﬂicer, a doctor, a social worker,
representatives of the Department of Youth and Community Services, the
prosecutor appearing in court, and perhaps a solicitor if the child makes an
application for compensation and at a later stage there may be the need for
interviews with counsellors from the Family Court and lawyers appearing in
those proceedings. Apart from all this, the child must suffer the ordeal of giving
evidence in a criminal court, firstly, at the committal proceedings and, secondly,
at the actual trial before a judge and jury. -
The goal of protecting the child victim from the ordeal of repeatedly having
to recount details of a sexual assault and protecting the child Victim from the
_ ordeal of court proceedings is a desirable one and there is a clear need to
examine alternative procedures. .
The techniques used to obtain relevant evidence in child sexual assault
cases can be improved by the use of videotaping equipment. the advantages of
having a videotaped record of the child’s statement in relation to the offence
are:
* the use of videotape allows the child’s evidence to be preserved
whilst recollection of the events in question is still fresh;
* it would spare the child witness the ordeal of having to recount
the facts on a number of occasions;
* the videotape recording is a valuable aid to both the prosecution
and the defence in the preparation of a case for trial;
4" See generally Paul Byrne ‘The Child Victim in Criminal Court Proceedings’ in National
Conference on Child Abuse, Proceedings aft/1e Australian Institute of Criminology No. 14
(I986), p. l3].
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* the use of the videotape recording will, in many cases, convince
an accused person of the fact that the child has made a complaint
and. encourage an admission of guilt and the consequent
avordance of distress for all those concerned in the trial process;
* from the point of view of the accused person, the videotape
recording can be used to check whether the child’s’ version of
events was unfairly prompted by improper questioning;
* if the interview is conducted by a properly trained examiner, a
complete record of relevant material in admissible form may be
obtained.
Videotape evidence has been used in courts in a number of States in
America.“ So far as I am aware, it has not been used in Australia.
2. Reducing the Intimidation 0f the Court Proceedings
The right of the accused person to be confronted by his or her accuser has .
traditionally been regarded as one of the fundamental rights of an accused
person. In the case of a child victim who alleges a sexual assault, the accused
person will often be either'related or well known to the victim. In these
' circumstances particularly, the right of an adult accused person to confront an
alleged child victim is regarded by some as being tantamount to a right to
intimidate the witness. In the United States, the right of an accused person to
be confronted by his or her accusers is guaranteed by the Constitution.
However, there are statutes which authorise the examination of a child witness
by live closed-circuit television outside the physical presence of the accused
person. This is permitted where the court is satisﬁed that the child is a
vulnerable witness and that- placing the child and the accused person in the same
room is likely to cause the child severe mental or emotional harm.42
It has been said that the right to confrontation clause was included in the
Constitution to prevent evidence or afﬁdavits being sworn against an accused
person without giving that person the opportunity of testing the recollection and
conscience of the witness and to compel the witness to stand face to face with
the jury in order that the jury may determine by his or her demeanour in the
witness box and the manner in which the testimony is given, whether the
witness is worthy of belief.43 In upholding the validity of a statute which
provides for hearing child victims on closed-circuit television, the Superior
Court of the State of New Jersey observed that:
it is accepted as a fact that only a modest erosion of the clause, if
any, will take place. The child, through the use of video, will not be
obliged to see the defendant or to be exposed to the usual courtroom
atmosphere. Nevertheless, the defendant as well at the judge, the jury,
and the spectators, will see and hear her clearly. Adequate opportunity
for cross-examination will be provided. This is enough to satisfy the
demands of the confrontation clause. If it is not, it represents a deserved
exception. It is more that Wigmore' would require. Everything but
“ United States Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice ‘Prosecution of Child Sexual
Abuse: Innovations in Practice’ in Research in EriefNovember l985.
‘2 See the judgment of Mr Justice Bernstein in The People ofthe State ofNew York v Albert Algarin
(5 February I986) in which various authorites on this topic are collected. 1 am grateful to Rod
Howie, Director. Criminal Law Review Division, for drawing my attention to this case.
‘3 Mattox v United States 156 US 237 at 242—243 (1895).
 ‘eyeball-to-eyeball’ confrontation will be provided No case has held eye
contact to be a requirement. It is not demanded when a witness
”confronts a defendant in a courtroom. No court rule requires eye
contract and courtroom distances sometimes make contact impossible.“
The closed-circuit television system has also been upheld by the Supreme
Court of the State of New York which held that the essential elements sought
to be guaranteed by the confrontation provision are preserved.45 The
opportunity of the accused person, the judge and the jury to observe the
demeanour of the witness is not impeded. The procedure also enables the right
to cross-examination and it impresses upon the witness the seriousness of the
question at issue. Since the closed-circuit television procedure provides
substantial compliance with.the purpose of the confrontation requirement, it
does not violate the Constitutional right of the accused person to confront the
witness. It must be acknowledged that other courts have taken a different
approach by holding that the Constitutional provision required that there be
face to face contact between the witness and the accused person.“6 The
resolution of this conﬂict will have to wait for an authoritative decision on the
question by the United States Supreme Court.
In England, legislation has recently been passed permitting the evidence
of a witness under the age of 14 to be given in court proceedings through a live
video link.“7 This system enables children who are alleged to be victims of
sexual assault to give evidence in an environment which is generally free of
intimidation but which is sufﬁciently formal to impress upon the child the
seriousness of the exercise. The child victim is not required to confront the
accused person in court. The accused person, the judge and the jury can see the
child give evidence on a television screen in the courtroom, The child is
questioned in a different location in the presence of a ‘supporting’ adult. The
accused person cannot be seen by the child although the child will see on a
television screen lawyers and perhaps the judge who may ask questions. The
systems which are to be installed in English courtrooms would cost about
$100,000 each.“ The likely prejudice caused to an accused person by procedures
of this kind are their greatest drawback. If such a procedure is to be considered
here, my own view is that it should be used in all cases and not restricted to
those where the child is considered to be at risk. The fact that the procedure is
a standard one should reduce the prejudicial impact its use may otherwise have.
3. Inducements to a Plea of Guilty
The pre-trial diversion scheme which has been referred to above is clearly
an inducement to a person accused of the sexual assault of a child to plead guilty
and thereby save the child the distressing and damaging experience of having
to give evidence in court and be subject to cross-examination.
“ State v Shepard 484 A 2d 1330 at 1342—42 (1984).
‘5 The cases quoted in Algarin. note 42, include Kansas City v McCoy 525 SW 2d at 339; People
v Moran 39 Cal App 3rd 398 at 410 (I974).
4" Huchheiser v Superior Court 161 Cal App 3d 777 (1984); Reynolds v Superior Court 12 Cal App
3d 834 at 837 (I974); United States v Benﬁeld 593 F 2d at 821.
‘7 Criminal Justice Bill 1986 (UK) 521.
‘8 “Minx Heralds the End to ‘Molester‘s Charter’. ” The Australian, Tuesday 24 February 1987.
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There are additional means of encouraging pleas of guilty. The ﬁrst
involves a practice which is used in England and has come to be described as
permitting the trial judge to give a ‘sentence indication’.49 This involves the
Crown and the legal representatives of the accused person asking the judge
before the trial what the likely penalty would be in the event that the accused
person were convicted. The judge is entitled to say, afterconsidering the
relevant facts of the offence and the circumstances of the accused person, what
he or she considers the appropriate penalty to be. This is not done by giving a
speciﬁc estimate but more by the indication that a particular type of sentence
appears to be appropriate. For example, the judge may indicate that a gaol
sentence is or is not likely to be imposed.
The primary concern of people accused of child sexual assault is their fear
of the likely penalty to be imposed in the event of a conviction. If accused
people were aware of the likely penalty instead of speculating about it, then it
would enable a much more informed decision as to plea and would probably
result in more pleas of guilty being entered.so
There is also the question of the ‘discount’ to be given to accused people
who plead guilty. This has been debated at some length and one prominent
judge has suggested that there should in effect be a ‘ﬂat rate discount’ of 25%
for people who plead guilty.5| The courts in New South Wales have generally
recognised that it is legitimate to take into account the fact of a plea of guilty
in reducing the penalty that would otherwise be imposed. This is done on the
ground that a plea of guilty, particularly in the case of sexual offences, spares
the victim the ordeal of giving evidence.52 In my view, the fact that a accused
person pleads guilty must be taken into account in his or her favour on the
question of sentence, but it would not be workable to determine the amount of
discount by legislative decree. That must depend on the particular circumstances
of each case and the motivation of the individual offender.
Procedures designed to induce a plea of guilty have been properly criticised
on the ground that they may be so attractive to an accused person that they
result in innocent people pleading guilty. This is always a risk and one which
must be carefully watched. My own view is that in the case of offences of child
sexual assault, the risk that an innocent person may plead guilty in order to
obtain a favourable penalty or disposition of the case is less serious than with
other criminal offences.
4. Amending the Laws ofEvidence
One of the most difﬁcult problems with the prosecution of child sexual
assault cases is the inability of the child to recall the event in question at the
trial. This is a particular concern with very young children because the rules of
evidence do not enable the out of court testimony which they have provided
to be given at the trial. The current position in New South Wales, where there
‘9 See generally New South Wales Law Reform Commission Procedurefrom Charge to Trial: Specific
Problems and Proposals (DP 14/2 1987) at Chapter 1 1.
5° Hampel G. (Mr Justice) ‘Plea Bargaining—A Judge’s Involvement’ (1985) 59 Law Institute
Journal 1305.
5' New South Wales Law Reform Commission, note 49, para 11.12 at 462-463.
52 R v Nichol/s and Bushby (Unreponed, Court of Criminal Appeal, New South Wales, 21 September
1978 per Cross J).
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are very long delays between the time of arrest and trial, exaggerates the
difficulty experienced in presenting this evidence before a court. Lapses in
memory are more likely to occur because of the time between the offence and
the trial. -
 
The reason why earlier testimony given out of court cannot be admitted
at the trial because it breaches the rule against the admission of hearsay
evidence. There are, however, many exceptions to the rule against hearsay which
allow for the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence. It could be argued
that there should be an additional exception created so that when a child gives
evidence that an earlier recording of his or her statements was made, then the
earlier statement should be received as evidence.53
In sexual assault cases there is already one..well known exception to the
rule against hearsay which holds that evidence of complaint is admissible to
show the consistency and therefore support the credit of the person who gives
evidence of being sexually assaulted.54
There does not seem to me to be any argument of logic or fairness which
could prevent the statement of a child which has been recorded on videotape
equipment being admissible in later court proceedings. This general rule should
be subject to certain conditions, namely that the statement was reasonably
contemporaneous with the event in question and was not induced by suggestion.
It is also necessary in the interests of fairness that the admissibility of the
videotape recording should be conditional upon the child being called as a
witness and being liable to cross-examinatibn.
This proposal is consistent with the general line of reasoning adopted by
the Australian Law Reform Commission when it tentatively recommended that
if hearsay evidence is the best evidence available and can be shown to have
reasonable guarantees of reliabililty, it should be admissible.” This proposal
would permit hearsay evidence to be received if it was made when the facts
were ‘fresh’ in the memory of the child making it.
5. The Abolition of Committal Proceedings
The New South Wales Law Reform Commission has recently published .a
Discussion Paper dealing with that part of the criminal process between the time
an accused person is charged with an offence until the time of the trial of that
offence. We have proposed that the current procedure should be changed by
abolishing committal proceedings and replacing them with a different procedure
which would achieve all of the legitimate objectives of committal proceedings
but in a more efﬁcient manner.56 The major advantage of the proposed
procedure should be to dramatically reduce the time taken to bring criminal
cases to trial.
53 See J. T. Morgan “The Need for a Special Exception to the Hearsay Rule in Child Sexual Abuse
Cases” (1984) 21 Georgia State Bar Journal No. 2 at 50.
5‘ See generally Watson and Pumell Criminal Law in New South Wales—lna’ictab/e Oﬂences Volume
I para 2620.
55 Australian Law Reform Commission Interim Report Evidence (ALRC 26, 1985) para 683.
5“ See generally New South Wales Law Reform Commission Procudure from Charge to Trial: A
General Proposal for Reform (DP 13, I986); Procedure from Charge to Trial" Speciﬁc Problems
and Proposals(DP 14, I987).
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One of the consequences of the abolition of committal proceeding would
be that people who are said to be the alleged victims of criminal offences woul
d,
in most cases, only have to give evidence at the trial. Although this has n
ot
been put forward as a major argument in favour of the abolition ofcommittal
proceedings, it is a factor which should probably be weighed in the balance
as
a beneﬁcial feature of the proposed system. .
6. Defence ofProximate Age. '
It has been noted that in New South Wales there is no defence based on
the relative similarity in age between an alleged offender and a ‘victim’ o
f child
sexual assault. In both South Australia57 and Victoria58 there is a defence bas
ed
on the proximity in age of the parties. This is consistent with
the
recommendation made by the Royal Commission on Human Relationships
.”
Under the current law in New South Wales, a l6, 17 o
r 18 year old male
who has consenting sexual intercourse with a female aged
even a few day short
of 16 years, commits an offence which is punishable by
a maximum term of
imprisonment of eight years.60 This is obviously a manifestl
y unfair situation
which does nothing but bring the criminal law into disrepu
te. Although this
offence would rarely be prosecuted and would never be met
with a penalty such
as that which is available to the courts, where a potential i
njustice arising from
the terms of the legislation is patently clear, it should be
removed. For that
reason alone the ‘defence’ based on the proximate age
s of the accused person
and the ‘victim’ should be introduced. The primary purpO
se of child sexual
assault lawsshould be to prevent the exploitation of the y
oung, not to permit
the prosecution of people who are innocent of any crimina
l wrongdoing.
7. Homosexual Anomalies
It was noted earlier that there was one ‘notable’ exception to th
e sexual
assault laws which generally treated offences against males and female
s in an
equal way. The exception is the fact that the age of consent in cases of se
xual
activity between males and females is 16 years whereas the age of consen
t of
sexual acts between males is 18.6' In my view, this distinction is
difficult to
explain. There does not seem to be any valid reason why the general princ
iple
against discrimination should not be applied in this area. The tabl
es produced
above also outline the differences in penalty applying to homosexual offenc
es.62
These differences do not appear to be justiﬁed and on their face appea
r to be
unintended.
See South Australian Criminal Law and Penal Method
s Reform Committee Special Report Rape
and Other Sexual Oﬂences (1976) at 19-23.
Crimes Act 1985 (Vic) s. 48 (4) (b)
Royal Commission on Human Relationships Report (1977) at 222-226.
Crimes Ac! l900 5. 66C.
6' Crimes Act 1900 5. 78K.
Compare Crimes Act 1900 s. 66c with Crimes Act 1900 5. 78K and Crimes
Act 1900 55. 66A and
78HG, ss. 73A-78N.
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8. Penalty Guidelines on Offences of Wide Deﬁnition
It has also been noted earlier that some offences which carry speciﬁc
maximum terms of imprisonment upon conviction cover a wide. range of
prohibited activities. In my view, it would be desirable if some indication were
provided by the legislation to identify matters of aggravation and mitigation so
far as offences of child sexual assault are concerned.
9. Reorganisation and Reclassiﬁcation of Oﬁences
The current laws which establish offences of child sexual assault, and for
that matter the laws which establish offences of sexual assault generally, are in
a confused and inconsistent state as a result of three major items of amending
legislation being introduced in 1981, 1984 and 1985 respectively. This has
meant that various acts can be charged under different sections carrying
different penalties. Apart from this overlapping, it has resulted in some measure
of inconsistency in expression and in the application of principle.
It might also fairly be said that the various amendments have created a
maze of legislative enactments which are difficult to ﬁnd your way through. I
should say immediately that the people responsible for drafting the legislation
cannot be criticised for this since there has been so little time left to them to
achieve their difficult task. It seems to me that the legislation creating offences
of sexual assault can be greatly simpliﬁed and that it can be expressed in terms
which do not require any special training to understand. At the same time, this
process of simpliﬁcation should achieve the desirable objectives of removing
duplication and inconsistency of principle.63
10. Oﬂences in Company
Among its countless attractive features, there is one aspect of the 1981
sexual assault amendments which has always concerned me. It has not been
remedied by any of the subsequent legislation dealing with sexual assault, and
it applies therefore equally to adults and children as it does to males and
females. This is the fact that offences of sexual assault committed in company
are not treated as being a more serious category of sexual assault. The law
recognises that sexual assaults which inﬂict grievious bodily harm are the most
serious category of offence.“ Those which inﬂict actual bodily harm or in which
there is a weapon used are the next most serious category65 and those which do
not have either of these features fall into the general category.66
In my view, an offence of sexual assault which is committed in company
with one or more others, and this will cover offences commonly referred to as
‘pack rape’, should be in a more serious category and able to be met by a higher
penalty than is available for the general offence of sexual assault. Legislation
relating to the offence of robbery equates the use of a weapon with the
commission of the crime in company!‘7 I think that the same principle can
“3 See generally Law Reform Commission of Canada Towards a Codiﬁcation of Canadian Law
(Study Paper, 1976): Codiﬁcation of the Criminal Law: A Report to the Law Commission, Law
Comrﬁission Report No. 1430 (HMSO London 1985).
6‘ Crimes Act l900 s. 6H3 carrying a maximum penalty of 20 years’ gaol.
65 Crimes Act 1900 s. 61c carrying a maximum penalty of 12 years’ gaol.
6" Crime: Act 1900 s. 610 carrying a maximum penalty of seven years’ gaol.
67 Crimes Act 1900 s. 97 “Whosoever, being amied with an offence weapon, or instrument, or being
in company with another person. . . ".
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legitimately be applied to sexual assault offences.
This would mean that the
maximum penalty available to a person convict
ed ofa ‘paek rape.” would be ll
years instead of seven years.
I], .rlccc/eralcd Prosecution
In its recent Discussion Paper on procedure be
tween charge and trail. the
New South Wales Law Reform Commission ha
s recommended that there should
be time limits placed on the prosecution of criminal
olfences.“ In the context
of offences of sexual assault against children.
these proposals would. it.
implemented. mean that ifan accused person
is held in custody. the trial of‘ the
offence must commence within six months of
the time of that person's arrest.
Where the accused person is on bail. the tria
l of the offence must commence
within 18 months of the arrest. If both these time
limits were met. it would
result in a considerable reduction in the delays
currently experienced by people
awaiting trial. These delays are not only of c
oncern to the. accused person.
Unreasonable delays naturally prolong the tra
uma caused by having to keep in
mind incidents and events which witnesses would rath
er forget.
It is encouraging to note that the specialist unit
of the Solicitor lktt‘tl’ttlnlic
Prosecutions has already taken steps to make
sure that the delay in the hearing
of child sexual assault cases is reduced so far as
possible and that this policy is
complemented by that adopted by the Solicit
or for Public Prosecutions which
gives priority to child sexual assault cases seco
nd only to that accorded to the
trial of accused people who are held in custod
y.
12. l 'ictim Issues: Reasons/or N0 Bill, Involvem
ent in ‘P/ca Bargaining’
These are matters of a relatively minor nature
within the overall scheme
of the criminal justice system. but they
are signiﬁcant matters so l‘ar as
individual victims are concerned. For too lon
g the practice‘of abandoning
prosecutions has been allowed to take plac
e without due regard being paid to
the right of the alleged victim to know why th
is action has been taken. Naturally
there will be some cases in which reasons cannot b
e given. but as a general rule.
it seems to me that the victim should be on
e of the ﬁrst people to know why
the prosecution of a particular case has been
discontinued.“"
So far as 'plea bargaining‘ is concerned. pr
osecuting authorities do. from
time to time. consider the likely impact ofa
trial upon the prosecution witnesses
as a factor to be taken into account in dete
rmining whether or not to accept an
approach'made by or on behalf of the accus
ed person to plead guilty to a lesser
charge or in some other way to apparently r
educe the seriousness of the offence
for which he or she is convicted or the
likely penalty to be imposed. The
‘interests of the victim” is a factor which looms
large in considering whether or
not to prosecute in cases of child sexual as
sault.
The New South Wales Law Reform Comm
ission‘s proposal in this area is
that il‘thc interests ofthc victim are to be take
n into account. then it IS essential
that the victim or a person who is repre
senting the interests ol the Victim.
 
"" See generally New South Wales Law Re
form Commission ProcedureI/i'tmt ('IIquLIc
In THU/I Speciﬁc
l’ri'r/t/eltt.v uml I’M/mxu/S (DP l4/l. I987) at (‘
huptet‘ 3.
““ izl at Chapter ll). See also New South
Wales Task Force on Services for Victi
ms of Crime ( l 987)
lie/tori um/ Re:'rwtutcm/ulimtx p.p. l 17-!
IS.
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should in fact be consulted and the attitude of the victim to the conduct ofthe
trial known before making such a decision.70 As a general rule, the prosecuting
authority should also explain to victims why any form of agreement may have
been reached with the accused person and the reasons why that decision has
been made.
I 3. Judicial C0nIr0/5 on Cr035-Examination
The 1981 amendments introduced speciﬁc controls over the manner of
cross-examination of complaints in sexual assault cases. Similar rules have been
introduced for the trial of offences of child sexual assault. It is apparent from
studies conducted by the Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research that the
application of these controls by judges and magistrates conducting trials and
committal proceedings is inconsistent and has, in some cases, failed to achieve
what are seen to be objectives of the legislation.7|
It is, naturally, difﬁcult to impose standards of judicial conduct by
legislation. It does appear necessary, however. to make some additional attempt
to ensure that the examination of witnesses in child sexual assault cases does
not go beyond the legitimate boundaries of either speciﬁc legislation or the
general requirement of ethical conduct.
I4. .-lna10mical Dolls
One of the diﬂiculties faced by children when giving evidence in a sexual
assault case is their inability to express themselves in terms which'are acceptable
as proof in a court. The requirements of proof in child sexual assault cases may
be quite precise and involve concepts which are completely foreign to the
understanding or experience of a young child. Apart from problems of
comprehension,_ there isa signiﬁcant problem that a child, particularly in the
company of adults in a formal and in some senses hostile atmosphere. will be
unable to say what has happened because ofa sense of embarrassment or fear.
The use of anatomically correct dolls has been tested in America and has
shown that children are able to explain what has happened to them in a much
more realistic way when taken from their point of view, but in a manner which
can nevertheless be very easily understood and perhaps better appreciated by
the adults who are involved in deciding the issues which arise in the case.
15. The Rig/It of a Private Citizen [0 Prosecule
The writing on the subject of child sexual assault continually” emphasises
how traumatic the experience of a criminal trial is upon a young child who
claims to have been sexually assaulted. In many cases commentators frequently
argue that the experience of the trial is far more damaging than the impact of
the sexual assault itself. It is, for these reasons, that very careful steps have been
taken to ensure that the decision to prosecute is not made without taking into
account the interests of the child. This is not to say that a trial which does have
a damaging effect on a child should never be commenced. It is simply an
7" New South Wales Law Reform Commission Prater/lirefin/n Charge In Trial: Speei/ic I’ro/i/emx
and Proposals (DP 14/2. I987) at Chapter ll.
7' New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research Interim Report No. 3—C'0Hrl
l’im'er/ures January 1987. pp. 1—3 and 71.
 59
acknowledgment that one of the factors to be taken into account in determining
whether or not to continue a prosecution is the likely impact of t
he court
proceedings upon the child in question.
In this regard, the prosecuting authority is now required, as a matter of
policy, to consult with the Department of Youth and Community Servi
ces to
determine what is in fact in the best interests of each individual child who ma
y
be involved in a prosecution of sexual assault.72
The question which must be considered is whether this elaborate sch
eme
ensuring that prosecutions are not launched without due regard being paid
to
the interests of the child can be wiped away by the exercise by a priv
ate
individual of the right to prosecute. In the context of child sexual assault, this
may happen if a parent is dissatisﬁed with the decision of the prosecuti
ng
authority not to prosecute and then decides to launch the prosecution
privately.
The right of the individual to prosecute is an important safeguard against
the perceived incompetence of public prosecuting authorities, but it should not
be' capable of being exercised in a manner which is either malicious or
oppressive.73 Whilst the courts will have the ultimate control over the use of
the_power to prosecute and a person wrongly accused may have a reme
dy in a
civil action for malicious prosecution, there will be some cases where
serious
harm may be done to an otherwise innocent person by bringing the matt
er
before the court in the ﬁrst place. The victim of a child sexual asSault is such
a person and in order to afford sufﬁcient protection against this occurring, I
would suggest that in all cases of sexual assault involving young people,
the
prosecution should not proceed without the consent of the Attorney Genera
l.
This has already been recognised in relation to the prosecution of h
omosexual
offences involving people under 18.74 In my view, it should be made a general
provision in cases of child sexual assault.
The recent establishment of the Office of the Director of
Public.
Prosecutions and the specific power available to the Director
to take over
prosecutions which have been launched by another person and eithe
r continue
them or terminate them is a power which could be used in this area
to prevent
potentially damaging prosecutions being continued.75
The matters referred to above are submitted for consideration as
possible
directions which the reform of the law and legal procedures relating to c
hild
sexual assault might take. Since most of them require further examination,
they
should not be implemented until their likely impact has been care
fully
considered.
At the beginning of this paper the point was made that child sexual ass
ault
is an area in which our legislators should tread carefully. A great deal has
recently been done and it is now probably time to examine how those chang
es
are working in practice. We have to discover whether the refor
ms already
 
q 1 Child Sexual Assault Task Force Report (I985) p. 91—92.
7-‘ see note 35.
7‘ see note 36.
75 Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1986 s. 9.
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achieved, coupled with the extensive publicity given to this topic, have been
effective either in reducing the incidence of child sexual assault or in the
prosecution of offenders.
It is important that the community should remain concerned about child
abuse but it is more important that there should not be panic and overreaction.
There is a possibility that too much over-emotional publicity will do .more
damage than anything else. The suggestion that parents, in particular, are
potential sexual assailants, however valid it may be in some cases, may be more
than most children are psychologically equipped to deal with.76 The war against
child molesters is a good idea but not if its ﬁrstcasualty is the innocence of
children. .
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THE PROBLEMS OF INVESTIGATION
Detective Sergeant 1st Class J. Thornthwaite
Juvenile Services Bureau
Criminal Investigation Branch,
Police Department, N.S.W.
. History of Juvenile Services Bureau ‘
The Minister for Police and Emergency Services announced that the State
Government has embarked on an all—out campaign against child abuse and
juvenile crime. The Minister also approved the formation of the Juvenile
Services Bureau, Criminal Investigation Branch, to spearhead the campaign. To
form that Bureau, the Juvenile Crime Squad and the Child Mistreatment Unit
were combined to form a ‘strike force’. The Bureau commenced on the 19th
August, 1985.
The Juvenile Services Bureau is under the command of a Detective
Inspector and apart from the central unit at the Criminal Investigation Branch,
‘there are decentralised units at Cambelltown, Penrith, Bankstown, Chatswood,
Newcastle, Lismore, Dubbo and Wollongong.
Objectives of Juvenile Services Bureau.
0 Investigation of allegations of sexual molestation and exploitation of
children, including child pornography and child prostitution.
0 Investigation of most crime committed by children.
0 Maintain a proactive approach towards child mistreatment and juvenile
crime.
0 Protection and welfare of children.
0 Co-ordinate and monitor police responses in connection with allegations
of sexual molestation, exploitation and physical abuse committed upon
children which have been reported by other Government Departments.
0 Monitor the implementation of Child Protection Programmes. _
o Co-ordinate the investigation of all unusual reports of missing children.
0 Maintain suitable records of all absconders.
0 Co-ordinate with all other Government Departments and other agencies
in the welfare and protection of children. ‘
Trends after twelve months Operation
In the twelve months period a deﬁnite trend has appeared. We have
received a total of 1640 notiﬁcations. Out of those 1210 are related to sexual
exploitation of children whilst the remaining 430 are children who have been
physically abused by family members.
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These ﬁgures indicate that the bureau has become a complete reactive unit
and therefore we are unable to meet all of our objectives. The problem of
juvenile crime and missing children cannot be investigated by this Bureau. That
problem is left to other police to investigate during the normal course of their
duties.
We at the Bureau would like to think that we could become more proactive
and make a frontline attack upon juvenile crime and missing children.
Comparison between New South wales and Queensland.
An interesting trend has appeared in this State. The sex of children coming
to notice in the 1640 notiﬁcations is 36% male and 64% female. In Queensland
a study of 400 notiﬁcations indicated a fairly equal relationship with 53% female
and 46% male. The age distribution in both studies indicates an alarming trend
in the number of children coming to notice up to the age of ﬁve and then
gradually reducing to the age of 11 when there is a sharp reduction for the
adolescent years. In both states no less than seventy-one percent of sexual abuse
cases are aged under 1 1.
The Police and The Law
Having established that the greater proportion of child abuse involves
victims under the age of 11, we must then look at the past and available laws
that police have at their disposal to investigate crimes, arrest offenders and
ﬁnally, and I think the most important; the health and welfare of the victim.
Prior to the 23rd March, 1986, police in a greater proportion of the cases
investigated laid charges under the following sections of the Crimes Act 1900.
Sections 61A (1), (2), (3) and (4): Sexual intercourse, categories (1), (2), (3)
and (4).
Section 67: Carnal knowledge of girl under 10
Section 71: Carnal knowledge of girl under 16 over 10
Section 73: Carnal knowledge of girl under 10 by school teacher or father
etc. ~
Section 74: Carnal knowledge of girl under 16 over 10 by school teacher
or father etc.
On the 23rd March, 1986, new amendments were introduced into the
Crimes Act which abolished ss. 67, 71, 73 and 74. They were the sections that
this Bureau mainly used to place offenders before the courts.
It would be true to say that most of our charges were laid under s. 71 of
the Crimes Act which was carnal knowledge of a girl under 16 years and over
ten years. That section carried a penalty of penal servitude for ten years. Most
of our convictions were obtained under that section and of course the offenders
were sentenced by virtue of that same section. Section 66C (1) was introduced
in its place and carried a penalty of only eight years. It was felt at this Bureau
that an injustice to the victim had occurred by lowering the penalty. Carnal
knowledge of a girl by her father, step-father or teacher carried a penalty of
fourteen years penal servitude. This offence has increased alarmingly during the
past twelve to eighteen months, however, 5. 66C (2) (a) and (b) only carries a
penalty of penal servitude for ten years. We are obtaining more convictions and
the penalties are becoming lower.
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The main problem in proving any child a
buse matter that is before the
courts is the age of the victim and to a les
ser degree medical evidence. As
previously stated most complainants are under
the age of l l and usually there
is some time between the commission of the of
fence and medical examination.
. J ., .
Section 4058 (b) of the (Mines Act, now s
tates
. . . a judge on. the trial of a person for child se
xual assault offence may
in an appropriate case, but Will no longer
be reqmred to, warn the jury
of the danger of conv1cting the accused on
the uncorroborated eVidence
of the Victim...
It must be appreciated that most of the vict
ims have lived in fear for a
number of years. Obtaining corroboration is
extremely difﬁcult and we must
rely upon a child appearing in an open c
ourt and describing in detail acts that
have been committed upon her or him.
usually by some person whom they
loved and trusted. Even though 5. 4053 (b) of th
e Crimes Act is now in existence,
judges are exercising their discretionary
powers and warn nearly all juries that
it is unsafe to convict on the uncorroborated
evidence of a child.
It is a world wide fact that children do
not tell lies in relation to sexual
abuse that has been committed upon t
hem by a person in authority. We have
found that once the child has decided to tell
someone the truth and they have
received expert counselling, they will clearly
and concisely tell their story. They
do not color it. nor do they expand on
any facts. Their recall is excellent and
once they feel that they are receiving hel
p they will open up their hearts to those
who are now giving that help.
Another danger is the pressure placed u
pon the child not to give evidence
at court. That pressure usually comes f
rom within the family and nothing can
be done to change that fact. Section 407AA
ofthe Crimes Act attempted to ease
that pressure by making spouses comp
ellable to give evidence in some chi
ld
assault offences. Once again judges are
using their discretionary powers and ar
e
excusing spouses from giving evidenc
e.
0
A serious side issue has appeared in-the no
tification of child abuse matters.
As a matter of routine. most of the child
abuse matters that come to the notice
of police. come from the Department of Yo
uth and Community Services. Those
officers are well trained and have great empath
y with the victims of child abuse.
However 5. 1483 of the Child Welfare Act 193
9 stated amongst other things:
5. 148B (1) In this section—
(2) Any person who forms the belief upon rea
sonable grounds that a child—
(a) has been assaulted or
(b) is a neglected child within the meaning o
f Part XIV may—
(c) notify theDirector of his belief and t
he grounds therefor either orally
or in writing; or
(d) cause the Director to be so notiﬁed.
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(3) A prescribed person who, in the course of practising his profession,
calling or vocation, or in exercising the functions of his oﬂice, as the
case may be. has reasonable grounds to suspect that a child has been
assaulted. ill—treated or exposed shall— .
(a) notify the Director ofthe name or a description of the child and those
grounds either orally or in writing; or
(b) cause the Director to be so notiﬁed, promptly after those grounds
arise.
(5) Where the Director has been notiﬁed under subsection (2) or (3). he
shall—
(a) promptly cause an investigation to be made into the matters notiﬁed
to him; and _
(b) if he is satisﬁed that the child in respect of whom he was notiﬁed may
have been assaulted, ill-treated. or exposed, take such action as he
believes appropriate which MAY include reporting those matters to
a constable of police.
This section is a matter of concern for police as we are aware of a large
number of criminal matters that have come to the notice of the Department‘of
Youth and Community Services and because of some people interpreting
s. 14813, in that they do not have to report matters to the police, offenders are
not being dealt with according to law.
Another by-product of this lack of reporting is that the victim has no power
to claim criminal compensation for the crimes that have been committed upon
them.
Conclusion
We at the Juvenile Services Bureau feel that they should be consulted
before changes to legislation pertaining to juveniles and sexual offences are
made. We are only too well aware of the offences being committed upon
children and the various Acts and Sections that are best suited to obtain
convictions at court. There must also be changes made to other Acts of
Parliament so that serious child abuse matters are brought to notice. I feel that
all victims must receive'compensation for the crimes that have been committed
upon them. ~We realize that we are not in the position to be able to arrest every
person; that is not the answer. The victim is, and will always remain, our main
concern. .
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First of all I would like to apologise that Detective Sergeant Thornthwaite
is not here. He was taken ill this afternoon so I have been asked to deliver the
paper. The ﬁrst occasion I saw it was this afternoon so I decided that if it was
suitable I would speak to his paper and then add some matters of my own to
expand on what he was saying in his paper.
There are two sections in what I wish to say: One is to deal with adult
sexual abuse and the other is to deal with child sexual abuse. Obviously the
New South Wales Police Department has a fairly strong involvement with both
areas. I will ﬁrst of all deal with child sexual abuse to follow on from Mr Byrne’s
comments.
The Police Department became involved in child sexual abuse and dealing
with it in about 1978. We obviously dealt with some isolated incidents prior
to that, but at that stage the administration of our organisation recognised that
child abuse was becoming a major problem, and we were becoming more and
more aware of incidences of child sexual abuse occurring. It_took a while for
the political forces to recognise that there needed to be reforms in this area,
and I think that the New South Wales Police can claim some credit for
encouraging people to see the problems involved in children who were sexually
abused.
We have in this State the Juvenile Services Bureau which is the main arm
of the New South Wales Police dealing with child sexual abuse. It was
established as it is now in 1985 speciﬁcally to look at a number of issues, and
its charter and recent statistics are set out on pages 61—62 of Detective Sergeant
Thornthwaite’s paper.
Mr Thornthwaite made the point that in Queensland it is about ﬁfty-ﬁfty
males and females reporting sexual abuse. Talking to the Juvenile Services
Bureau this afternoon it seems to be that the trend is towards more young boys
reported with sexual abuse Cases in relation to them.
I think that the Juvenile Services Bureau has obviously been involved in
legislative reform and legislative change that we are reasonably conﬁdent it is
commencing to work. It will take quite some time. The majority of matters that
they deal with are charges that are laid under 5. 66C (i) for children under ten,
and s. 61D~and E for children over that age, but I think it would be dishonest
of me to say otherwise than that we still do have problems, major problems in
investigating child sexual abuse. Let me just canvass what some of those are;
Mr Byrne has canvassed some of them and I would like to support him in the
comments that he has made.. '
First of all we have a major problem in dealing with the conﬂict of interests
between a child who claims to be sexually abused and the parent. That is the
major area that we deal with—children being abused by people that they know.
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The conﬂict of interest is that if we wish to interview a child, under section
81C we have to gain permission of the parent. We have some difﬁculties in that
regard, but we try and work through that process but in investigation it is a
problem. We have suggested, and I would suggest, as Mr Byme has, that a
guardian ad [item type system, or some freeing up of the process of the Bureau
being allowed to interview children would be an advantage in our investigation
of these crimes.
The second issue has been referred to as children not being believed/I
acknowledge there has been increased acceptance of children who are believed
in these cases, but the situation is very slow to improve in courts. Many of our
police ofﬁcers are under enormous stress when trying to present cases before a
court that appears to them not to acknowledge that the child can be telling the
truth. There are also people within our organisation and others who still seem
to believe, the myth I think, that children lie. It comes about by saying: “Well,
they recanted. They changed their minds”. That is often brought about by a
large number of other matters, not necessarily the fact that the child has told a
lie in the ﬁrst place. As a society we have to acknowledge that fact more and
more. It took some time to acknowledge that women did not lie in the main
about sexual abuse so it will take us quite some time to acknowledge that
children also do not lie.
One of the major problems that we have is the pressures on children not
to go ahead: pressures by families, pressures by relatives, normal pressures that
they do not go ahead with the matter. And when you are ﬁve or six years old
those pressures are enormous. '
Another problem is that of time delays. Again I recognise that we have
improved, but as investigators police ofﬁcers have great difﬁculties in trying to
get matters before a court. Some of the delays involved can be two and a half
years—that is the longest we have had so far. At present, for a four day hearing
it is approximately seven months before you can get before a court. For a ﬁve
year old these are quite intolerable delays.
One of the matters again Mr Byrne mentioned was ex oﬂicio indictments.
That may be the way to do away with committal hearings; to allow children to
give their evidence once only and to try and decrease the delays in the court
system. Perhaps another way is to construct some special courts to overcome
the whole time delay problem and the difﬁculties for children appearing in
court. Many young police ofﬁcers say to me: “Have you been to a court lately?
Have you seen how awesome it can sometimes be giving evidence in those
courtroom situations?”. How much more awesome is it for a four or ﬁve or six
year old if they actually get that far to give evidence. We have done very little
to improve the courtroom situation in this State.
Another problem is the forensic evidence. We as investigators have
difﬁculty in trying to substantiate cases using forensic evidence for obvious
reasons. If they have gone on for some time there is often no forensic evidence
available. We believe that there is sometimes a lack of people who are proﬁcient
and able to give forensic evidence on our behalf. It is often required, and it is
one of the ways that we can substantiate a case. Perhaps we should look at other
ways of substantiating a victim’s complaint. For instance, whilst I was overseas
recently I noted the use of expert witnesses; people who attest that that child
has symptoms that are consistent with being sexually abused. That maybe one
of the ways we can take some pressure off the forensic investigation.
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The ﬁnal area for comment is interviewing the victims. I freely admit that
we do not have enough people in the New South Wales police skilled in the
area of dealing with and interviewing children. Additional police resources
would help. Dual interviews with YACS or other community professionals,
video taping (as suggested by Mr Byrne and certainly suggested in the United
States) may help us to reduce that trauma and improve that situation.
Let me say that I think we have done an enormous amount
in trying to
deal with children who are sexually abused, but let me also say that I
think we
have a substantial way to go. '
Let me turn now to adult sexual abuse. Again investigation in this
area
was established quite some time ago and a substantial number of p
olice ofﬁcers
have been involved, particularly female police officers. At on
e stage, ten or
ﬁfteen years ago, when I first joined the New South Wales police, the p
eople
who dealt with it were female ofﬁcers who were trained to take state
ments and,
in fact, it was mostly the task that we had. What has happened
since then is
that there has been a recognition that the Police Department needed su
pport
in trying to present cases on sexual assault. That occurred when legisl
ation and
procedures began to be changed in 1978 and 1979. 1981, of course, sa
w the
implementation of new legislation designed to improve that situation. I
t also
saw a number of other bodies such as the Health Commission, b
ecome involved
and ﬁnd appropriate facilities to collect forensic evidence and
to provide
support. I went to a co-ordinators’ meeting where I was impressed to see c
o-
ordinators from sixty Sexual Assault Centres from all over the State. I c
an recall
the days when there was about one hospital only where you could take a v
ictim
of sexual assault. We have come a substantial distance but not as yet far en
ough.
I think in regard to police training we have tried to improve that situation.
We presently have twelve people speciﬁcally assigned to deal with se
xual assault.
They deal with serial matters or serious sexual assaults. There ob
viously are
not enough of them to be able to go to all sexual assault matters. S
ome people
may say that perhaps there should be 100 police assigned to that
area. We have
certainly thought about that process. Sexual assault is something that oc
curs
over this entire State. We have opted to take the action of imp
rOving our
response altogether, not just with a few police, but with as man
y police as
possible to deal with sexual assault.
We are improving in the increase in the number of people, who when they
report offences, the police will choose to believe that that off
ence is true. It is
an attitude change that has to go on amongst police ofﬁcers and within
society.
The police force reﬂects the attitudes of society. That attitude m
ust be
improving if we are accepting more complaints, as appears by from t
he statistics
in the paper by Helen L’Orange and Sandra Egger.
Let me conclude by saying I would hope that a trend where chi
ld sexual
abuse starts to gain more prominence that adult sexual assaul
t does not continue
I think both issues are equally prominent and we have an awfully l
ong distance
to go in both matters. '
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John Farrell, LL.M., Magistrate
Signiﬁcant procedural changes through the 1981 Crimes Amendment and
the 1985 Oaths Amendment Acts were respectively—
(1) the restriction on cross-examination of female complainants (in the
interests of humanity and the encouragement of complaints).
(Hansard 18.3.81 LA N. K. Wran); and
(2) The sanction of unsworn statements by victims of tender years.
The former represented a fundamental breach of the rationale of an
adversary system, i.e.:
(a) cross-examination is the best tool ever designed to ascertain truth; and
(b) to deny the testing by cross-examination of evidence, was a denial of
natural justice.
\
Both these amendments touch the general question of abolition of the dock
statement.
In the former case (1981) the change fell short of earlier and concurrent
proposals that the beneﬁt of a dock statement be denied to an accused in the
subject sexual areas. Perhaps it wasconsidered too close to the eleventh hour
defection which prevented total abolition in 1974. But the total acceptance and
subsumption of the 1981 changes ought now to encourage legislators to go the
full distance. Victims will never be satisﬁed and indeed the positive objectives
set out by the Premier in 1981 will never be activated until the accused is
restricted either to silence or cross-examination (like the victim).
The latter case (child victims) presents an even more compelling case for
denial of the statement NOT subject to cross-examination. How does one
explain'to a member of the public (lawyer or not) that it is fair and just that a
ten year old child need not be sworn because he or she is too young to
understand but will nevertheless be subject to what could be a lengthy gruelling
and even ,damaging cross-examination whilst the accused an adult, who may
understand, (he may be a lawyer!) may also NOT be sworn but notwithstanding
will NOT be subject to cross-examination? A currently informed public would
probably shout “Fraudl”. ' -
Both logic and justice demand abolition of dock statements not .subject to
cross-examination in these areas.
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Maggie Smythe, Women’s Health Unit, N.S.W. Health Department.
There are'a'number of comments I would like to make.
One is regarding an area which I think has been omitted but has been' of
concern to me for a number of years, that is the whole position for‘
developmentally disabled children and adults trying to give evidence in courts
and have their cases heard in court. I know of a number of situations where
cases have not been taken up because of that. It is an issue that I think needs
to be addressed.
The other comments that I would like to make are regarding the child
sexual assault paper of Paul Byrne. In general I think I would agree with most -
of the things that he has raised. One of the issues that I think is important in
looking at is the use of video tapes. My experience with children has been that
sometimes initially they do not tell you everything, and my concern is that if
we video a statement early on and then have what may be perceived as
inconsistencies later, that that may be used against the child.
I think the idea of using closed circuit television within courts is a very
good one and could be used in lots of cases. I would support that.
Helen L 'Orange
On the point about us needing to look again at provisions in relation to
developmentally disabled, I have noted that down to go on the agendas of
both
the Sexual Assault Committee and Child Protection Council.
Professor Kim Oates, Paediatrician, Children’s Hospital Camperdown.
I wish to make a brief comment about some recent research that
we
ﬁnished this week on child sexual assault, and then ask a question of Mr Byr
ne.
We have just finished an in-depth study of 49 sexually abused children and
the parts of the study relevant to this meeting are the cases which went to court
.
Twenty one of the 49 cases went to court. '
One of the things we looked at was delays. It was pleasing that twelve of
those 21 cases were in fact heard within two weeks but ﬁve of them waited over
six months. I certainly take Christine Nixon’s point that those delays for a child
who is developmentally maturing and changing, and whose perceptions a
re
changing, are extremely difﬁcult for that child to cope with.
Of the 21 that went to court only six‘ children were asked to give evidence,
and there was a distinct correlation with whether the offender was
legally
represented and whether the child was asked to give evidence. In nine ca
ses the
offender was legally represented, and in ﬁve of those cases the child was asked
to give evidence. In the other twelve cases the offender had no represe
ntation
and only one child was asked to give evidence. I think we can anticipate
that
as more offenders become legally represented (as is their right), more children
will be asked to give evidence.
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The other thing we looked at was to ask the parents their views of how
the children were soon after the court hearing and how they were two and a
half years later when we reviewed them and studied them. There was a very
high incidence of parents reporting the children being upset and disturbed after
the court hearing, and, in fact, a high incidence of them still being disturbed
two and a half years later. When we looked at school performance and
personality tests on the children we found that those children whose cases had
been to court were doing worse at school and had more disturbances. Now, this
does not mean that the court hearing caused that—it might have been that the
worst cases went to court, but I think it gives some food for thought about the
problems courts cause in some of these cases.
I would like to make another comment and then ask a question about pre-
trial diversion.
As‘people know the majority of child sexual assault is within the home
and I guess the commonest form is father/daughter incest, or a young girl and
some male in the family. As people have pointed out the child is really in an
absolutely powerless position. The child is not usually forced into this but
coerced into it, and coerced by a variety of threats. The threats can include,
and I am talking about a child of four or six who is amenable to these sort of
threats: “If you don’t comply I will kill you” or “If you don’t comply I will kill
your mother” or “. . . take away your pets” or “. . . take all your toys” or “You
will all have to go and live in a tent”. Little four and six year olds believe this
sort of thing, and what happens to the child is that the child believes she has
the power to hold the family together by complying and also feels she has the
power to destroy the family be revealing this information. That is a pretty
awesome responsibility for a young child. What caused our group concern is
that when the child does reveal the abuse a whole lot. of unpleasant events may
be set in train for the child—events which have to be set in train but perhaps,
as the legal reforms pointed out, could be improved. Sometimes the father’s
threats do come true because he goes to gaol, leaving the family without income
and a drop in standard of living.
From my research and reading in the area, pre-trial diversion seems one
of the most important things that can be achieved to stop some of these
unpleasant events from happening. I have known that it has been in the wind
for some time. I would really like to know when it is likely to happen. There
are a lot of things that have to be achieved before pre-trial diversion can
happen. There have got to be people who can treat the offenders. There has got
to be a whole system set in train. we know it is coming. It would be helpful to
know when it is going to be.
Paul Byrne
The statistics that you gave then about the incidence of children having to
appear in court were interesting. You said that of the 49 children in your study
21 of them went to court and only six gave evidence. I think the very signiﬁcant
thing that that revealed is, unless I am wrong about it, that in the other 15 cases
the accused person must have pleaded ‘guilty’. If the accused person had
pleaded ‘not guilty’ the child must go to court to say what happened to him or
her. .
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The other material that you put forward in your presentation supports the
contention that the most important thing that can be done ‘in this area is to
encourage, as far as is reasonably possible, people who are guilty to plead
‘guilty’. This is supported by your comments about the disturbance of the court
hearing upon the child and it having a far reaching impact even years later upon
the child’s performance at school and so on. The pre-trial diversion sche
me is
predicated on people pleading guilty. It has no application to people who do
not plead guilty. .
Some of those other things that I mentioned in my paper are designed to
encourage people to plead guilty. My own experience in appearing for a nu
mber
of accused people in cases of this kind is that if they can be shown in some way
that the child is prepared to come to court to say what happened they will
acknowledge their guilt. Most of them take the approach of saying “My chi
ld
would never say that about me. I don’t believe that it was ever said”. If you
had a video tape recording of the child’s statement and were able to show it
to
the accused person I think in many cases that would result in pleas of guilty
being entered and then the child, of course, not having to give evidence. In
those
cases that you referred to, 21 going to court and only six children giving
evidence, I do not think the important thing is whether or not the accus
ed
person is represented. The important thing is whether or not the accused pers
on
pleaded. ‘guilty’. Probably in most of those cases where the accused person
pleaded ‘not guilty’ he was also represented—the important factor is the plea
of ‘not guilty’ rather than representation.
Helen L ’Orange
In regard to pre-trial diversion the Attorney-General and the Minister for
Health and Minister for Youth and Community Services have now con
curred
about the nature of the treatment programme. The service wil
l be based at
Westmead. It will be starting about mid 1987.
Gillian Calvert, Acting Executive Ofﬁcer, Child Protection Council.
I have some comments to make on the police paper.
In relation to your statistics of 1640 notiﬁcations that you received, how
many did you charge? ‘
Christine Nixon
I am sorry, I do not know.
Gillian Calvert
Of those 1640 notiﬁcations you quote the statistics as 36 per cent ma
les
and 64 per cent females being victims. I take it that that, in fact, includes
both
physical assault and sexual assault? ,
Christine Nixon
That’s victims.
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Gillian Calvert
In a sense your ﬁgures could be perhaps skewed. The statistics that are
available from Youth and Community Services indicate that there is a difference
in gender between the different forms of abuse. You are more likely to get an
equal number of males and females with physical assault cases, if anything boys
are slightly over represented with physical assault cases whereas with sexual
assault cases girls are signiﬁcantly over represented in the statistics. So I would
wonder whether those statistics are in fact skewed by the lack of differentation
of the types of abuse against children.
Christine Nixon
Let me say they might be, but I am going on the matters that the Police
Department hears of. There may be matters ‘that Youth and Community
Services choose not to bring to the police attention, and those are the matters
’ that you are talking about.
Gillian Calvert
I just think that you need to. consider that your statistics, in fact, include
both types of assault, bOth sexual assault and physical assault.
\
I guess similarly with the issue of age. Physical assault tends to occur when
a child is much younger, and tends to be reported when a child is younger,
whereas sexual assault while it occurs when the child is younger often does not
get reported until they are older. Again I think that sort of clariﬁcation needs
to be made.
Similarly when Jim Thornthwaite talks about judges’ exercising their
discretion with s. 4053 (b) and 407A (a) do you have any statistical basis for
that or is it an impression?
Christine Nixon
I think they are impressions.
Gillian Calvert
Finally on the page 64 you talk about YACS not referring cases to the
police. As I understand it, it is policy within the Department of Youth and
Community Services to involve police in these matters, and training certainly
supports that policy. Training that I have been involved in with the Department
encourages Youth and Community Services ofﬁcers to consult very early on with
police so that a joint investigation can take place as far as possible.
Christine Nixon
Yes, I understand that policy within Youth and Community Services does
encourage that, but again our impression is that there are certain areas that do
not get reported. And I think that that was the point that was being made there.
Obviously it will decrease I would think as policy and training increase.
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Gillian Calvert
You call for the Juvenile Services Bureau to be consulted but you were
represented on the Child Sexual Assault Task Force and you have representation
on The N.S.W. Child Protection Council and we will, of course, continue to
involve your department to the fullest extent.
Christine Nixon
I certainly understand and acknowledge that’s the case. We have been very
much involved.
David Williams, Office of the Minister for Corrective Services.
I was interested to note the references that were made in the address to
the use of guardian ad [item in England. I am very aware that the guardian ad
[item is used extensively in care proceedings in England, and to an increasing
extent is being used in criminal proceedings in English courts—more and more
in criminal proceedings where'children are not being called to give evidence
and where the evidence that is given by a guardian ad litem and/or employee
of the local authority social services department is accepted as evidence in
criminal proceedings.
Clearly there are evidential problems with that about the way that evidence
is gathered and presented to the court, but increasingly courts and social services
departments in England are accepting that court proceedings, both criminal and
care proceedings, are a further form of abuse of a child who has already suffered
an extreme form of abuse. It is interesting to keep in mind whether that is
possible in Anstralian courts, both civil and criminal.
With regard to the general issue of the abuse of children is the issue that
comes up once an offender is up for sentencing, particularly where there is a
high probability of a perpetrator receiving a heavy gaol sentence, a full-time
gaol sentence. I recently heard of a case where a child became extremely
emotionally disturbed when she heard of the possibility of her father, who had
perpetrated sexual offences against her over a period of seven years, going to
gaol for a number of years. At the conclusion of the proceedings where her
father received a periodic detention sentence the girl’s emotional disturbance
immediately ceased, and according to both the Health Department and the
Youth and Community Services Department ofﬁcials who were involved with
her that was directly related to the sentence given by the judge. I think that
that a further form of abuse against the child should be considered both by
courts in general and by judges when considering sentencing alternatives.
Chairman
Could I just ask, Mr Williams, in that case you mentioned of the seven-
year period of abuse and the periodic‘detention sentence was there some
condition imposed about the accused keeping away from the child? Was he
allowed to go on living in the same home?
Do you know what the detail was there? That is really a very traumatic
aspect of sentencing: the knowledge that on the one hand it is going to break
up the home, and on the other hand, the awareness that you cannot leave them
living in the same home again.
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David Williams
The girl was very aware in this case that by raising the issue of the sexual
offence that had occurred over a period of seven years had already broken up
the family home, had split up the relationship between the mother and the
father. The father has been forced to leave home prior to the criminal
proceedings being initiated. There was a recommendation by the judge, although
not an order, that he should not contact the victim or the family, and that after
the expiry of his periodic detention sentence to use the channel of Youth and
Community Services and the Health Department Sexual Assault Unit in
attempting to initiate contact, if that was what he wanted. The periodic
detention sentence was for a period of two years so presumably would not be
able to undertake that for that time. '
Chairman
One aspect of Mr Byrne’s paper upon which 'varying views might be held
is the strain and the trauma of the court hearing. It is bound up, of course, in
the fact that we prosecute sex offences, as we prosecute all other crimes, by the
adversarial process. The European court process does not involve the same
degree of trauma to the witnesses and particularly to the victim. I wonder
whether there are any views held on that. As we all know, where there has been
an alleged sex offence, the victim has had to go through the full details during
the police investigation. Then, some months later when she has been probably
trying to blot it out of her consciousness, she has got to re-live it all and undergo
cross-examination in the committal proceedings. Again some months later she
has once more got to call it all back vividly to mind and give evidence at the
trial. And even that is not necessarily the end: if it turns out that there has been
some defect in the trial resulting in a successful appeal, the appeal court faces
the very difﬁcult decision of whether the accused should be put on trial again
in the full awareness of thus re-awakening the horror for the victim when she
had thought everything had ﬁnished. This involves the balancing of community
expectations that an alleged wrongdoer should go free when he may richly
deserve punishment on the one hand, and on the other hand the realisation that,
at a point of time when the victim thinks it is all in the past and is probably
making substantial progress in getting it out of her mind, she is going to have
to go through it again. I pose the question—is our adversary system the best
means for bringing sex offenders to book? I should add that I ask that
- provocatively in the hope of stimulating discussion and not with the intention
of indicating that I hold any view to that effect.
Glenn Bartley, Barrister
My comments are not quite in answer to the question raised by the Chief
Justice of whether there should be a continental inquisitorial system as against
the adversary system we have here, but I do wish to deal with some other
aspects of his comments.
While we do retain the 'adversary system, and I suspect that we will for
many decades, if not centuries, to come, adult sexual assault victims still have
a very traumatic ordeal to go through, despite the reforms of the early 19805
dealt with in the ﬁrst paper. After the crime, the victim has got to brieﬂy tell
the ﬁrst civilians she sees what happened, be taken to some police ofﬁcers,
brieﬂy explain what happened, and then be taken to a female police ofﬁcer or
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a detective for a short interview. She then goes
oﬂ" to the hospital where there
is often a long wait for the social worker an
d doctor. After discussing a number
. of matters in considerable depth with the socia
l worker, there follows a forensic
examination by the doctor. Then the victim goes
back to the police station and
makes a long statement to the policewoman w
hich can take several hours. She
may not get any sleep on the night of’th‘e assa
ult, she may have to go back to
the scene to assist the police investigations‘she may
have to identify the offender.
She may have to give evidence in committal pro
ceedings (in a very uninviting
environment in front of the offender). The same oc
curs at the trial. If the ﬁrst
trial is aborted, or as the Chief Justice said
a new trial is ordered. the same
occurs again. Having appeared in compensation
applications for a number of
sexual assault victims. in my experience by the
time of the trial the victim has
usually lost contact with the social worker wh
om she met at the hospital on the
night of the offence. Usually victims have no sup
port person at the trial. Yet
they may be cross—examined by several cou
nsel if there has been a pack rape.
1f the defence consent it may be suggested
that she consentedto the lot and
had a happy time with the whole six of them.
There may be days of cross-
examining her by all defence counsel. yet at t
he end the acgpsed may make dock
statements and may be immune from cro
ss-examination. No victim will ever
be convinced that they should be allowed to
make dock statements when she
" went through such a prolonged and humil
iating ordeal in cross-examination.
Even when a rapist pleads guilty there is stil
l trauma, even under the
comparatively improved position compared with
the .19705. All too often, in
my observation, the Crown authorities seem to
treat a rape victim as a
disposable resource to be used or discarded as
thought fit. They have not been
told how the case is progressing. They are onl
y rung up a few weeks before the
trial after a very long period may have elapsed since
the committal proceedings.
They are given cursory explanations if there a
re adjournments. They should be
kept informed about the progress of a prosecu
tion right through until the end.
If there is a plea of guilty they might not be tol
d. They might find out by
accident later on that the case was disposed of a y
ear ago. In my submission,
most of these problems are experienced by a
ll victims of violent crime but a
lot of them are highlighted in the area of prosecut
ions for sexual assault.
Crime victims should be involved in plea barg
aining. If there are
discussions about breaking down charges, then the
victim should be consulted.
I am not suggesting victims should have a right of ve
to but, as has been observed
by others, they deserve a higher level of recognition
from the system. They are
more than a disposable prosecution resource.
Some victims may wish to be
relieved of the ordeal of a trial by way of some gu
ilty pleas to lesser charges.
Others may be outraged and want to bat on.
They are not given a say at the
moment and they should be. It is often galling for
rape victims that the defence
and the Crown can do a deal behind closed d
oors. The rapist is represented but
the victim is not. There is urgent need for reform
in that area.
On a plea of guilty. it seems to be the
practice for the Crown
representative. often a solicitor from the Public Pr
osecutions Ofﬁce, not to cross-
examine to any substantial extent the rapist on sen
tence. He gets in the box.
He grunts out a few words of contrition that
he is advised to utter by his
counsel, he blames it all on alcohol, marijuana, and i
n one case in which I
appeared. a ’Mad Max’ movie. None ofthat is ch
allenged. How the court can
have a balanced picture about the genuineness of the pu
rported contrition and
76
. mitigating factors is beyond me when the solicitors from the Public Prosecutions
Ofﬁce do not get up and substantially cross-examine on sentence. Rape victims
who observe that happening are appalled. The rapist turns up very well dressed,
he always loved his mother, he drank to much alcohol on the night, he has
woken up to himself, he is going to reform, and how about a bond? And little
is done to test that evidence. It is about time, in my submission, that Crown
representatives stand up on sentence, even if they just got the ﬁle two minutes
before, and test some of that evidence.
In a case in which I later appeared for an adult female rape victim in her
compensation application, the Crown asked a few desultory questions. The
evidence on sentence went on for days. The rapist was one of a number of
offenders some of whom committed ancillary offences on the husband of the
victim. At the end of that a Grifﬁth’s bond was imposed on the fellow who
pleaded guilty to sexual intercourse without consent. The Court of Criminal
Appeal later said there were strong subjective factors but sent it back for the
imposition of a custodial sentence, and a 'short custodial sentence was imposed.
The victim’s husband said to me soon after the ﬁrst instance hearing giving a
bond to the rapist, that he and his wife were disgusted, they felt like dirt, they
felt the system had let them down. Now that is a common theme expressed,
perhaps usually less strongly, by victims of sexual assault and their relatives
when the whole precess is over.
Ifl might ﬁnish on a controversial note, I suggest that the question of a
dock statements being made by persons accused of sexual assault still needs to
be reconsidered. It is important that victims of sexual assault have as much
incentive as possible to report what has happened to them and to bring their
violators to justice so that the community can be protected, but often the system
does not give them much incentive... It appears to rape victims and to those who
are close to them that it is extremely unevenhanded, particularly in a case of
pack rape where the defence is consent and the victim may for days on end in
cross-examination. Yet from the safety of ‘coward’s castle’, as it has been called,
they can impugn her in their dock statements and not be tested on them. If not
generally, then in cases of sexual assault, in my submission the‘question of
enabling accused persons charged with those offences to continue to make dock -
statements needs to be further examined.
For the arguments favouring retention of the right to make a dock
statement in the first paper, there was no empirical evidence provided. I concede
that my remarks suggesting abolition are lacking empirical evidence too, but
what I do know is that, having appeared for quite a number of sexual assault
victims, they think it stinks and such feelings and perceptions are a deterrent
to reporting and batting on with prosecution and assisting the Crown.
So while there has been substantial improvement as outlined in the ﬁrst
paper, I would suggest there is still further scope to alleviate the lot ofa sexual
assault victim in her long journey through the criminal investigation and trial
process.
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Paul Byrne
I must say that I agree’with you in some of the com
ments that you have
made, particularly what you said about the nee
d to keep the victims of offences
informed. Generally the Witnesses who are involved
in any prosecution should
be kept informed ofthe way in which it is going.
In my paper I have mentioned two particular th
ings which should be done
and which may have been done of late but certainly
have not been traditionally
done. The ﬁrst is that where there is a decision n
ot to prosecute, a ‘No Bill’,
the prosecuting authorites should, unless there is s
ome compelling reason not
to. tell the victim the reason for directing that No
Bill be ﬁled to the victim.
The second point you mentioned is the subject
of plea bargaining. Victims
should be consulted in relation to those sorts of a
rrangements where there is
negotiation between the prosecution and the ac
cused person as to the charges
that will ultimately be brought in court and th
e pleas that will be made.
In relation to the subject of‘dock statement’,
I must say that I appreciate
your experience in appearing for victims of sexua
l assault offences but my own
view is that the unsworn statement, as it s
hould properly be called, has a
legitimate role in the. criminal trial. I think much
of the opposition that is raised
against the unsworn statement is based on a fun
damental misconception as to
what a criminal trial is. Too many people,
particularly in the area of sexual
assault, regard the criminal trial as a contest
between the victim and the accused
person. It is not a contest between the vict
im and the accused person. It is a
contest between the prosecution and the acc
used person and it is not designed
to determine who has the better case. It is
designed to determine whether or
not the accused person is guilty. I think
the unsworn statement has the
legitimate role to play in that process.
It is interesting to note that there are three ma
jor law reform agencies who
have examined this subject within the last three y
ears. The New South Wales
Law Reform Commission unanimously recom
mended that unsworn statements
should be retained. The Victorian Law Reform
Commission of eight members .
recommended by a majority of six to two that the
accused person should attain
the right to give unsworn evidence. The Australia
n Law Reform Commission
has been examining the general subject of evidenc
e for something like six years.
As far as 1 know, it unanimously recommended
that the right of an accused
person to give an unsworn statement in a cr
iminal court should be retained. So
the issue has been very closely examined
by a wide range of groups over
relatively recent times bearing in mind all the public
ity that has been given to
unsworn statements and particularly the role
they play in sexual assault cases.
Each of those groups has come down, 1 think it
is fair to say, very ﬁrmly in
favour of retaining unsworn statements.
The reports of all those agencies are of course public
and available, and it
is not for me to now go into the reasons why we rea
ched the decisions we did
at the Commission where I work, but I think it
is important to note that there
was a unanimous vote of approval.
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Dr G D Woods QC
I must say I agree with a lot of what Glenn Bartley said with respect to
the question to the victim ofa sexual assault being, as it were, left in a state of
uncertainty with respect to what is happening as the process goes through.
That problem was precisely why the new system, as it is beginning to
operate, involves a continuity of the prosecution solicitor from the very earliest
point right through precisely so that the occasional phone call can be made.
There can be a particular person to whom a telephone call can be made by the
victim for the purpose of ascertaining what is happening. I think, to some
extent, that has alreadtyI been addressed.
With respect to the question of plea bargaining, it is certainly true that
people who are complaining of being the victims of assault (and in reality are
the victims of assaults) are sometimes angry that the prosecuting authorities,
having charged a person with (say) a category 2 and a category 3 sexual assault,
will on the door of the court break it down and accept a plea of guilty to a
category 3 sexual assault in full discharge of the indictment. Well, all one can
say about that is that one appreciates the anger but it is also true that the
prosecution has an independent role to play. It would be very wrong if the
prosecution processes of the State were put in the hands directly of those who
who are the victims and, indeed, although the right to be informed is an
important right, I think there are not many rape victims who would actually
wish to have a distinct role placed formally upon them by way of making a
decision with respect to the precise level of the charge that should be utilised
as the basis of the acceptance of a plea of guilty.
There are a lot of considerations that go into that. It is true there is often
hurly burly in the courts. It is often true that less care is taken about decisions
(or appears to be taken about decisions) than one might, in a paradisical
situation, desire. But none the less, by and large, prosecutors do think carefully
about the acceptance of pleas. I agree however that there ought to be a process
of informing, at' least—but as to it being consultation, (‘advise and consent’ in
the American terminology) I do not agree.
I appear frequently for the defence in these sorts of cases and Glen Bartley
appears frequently by way of making applications for compensation by victims,
so we may tend to take on the colours of thbse we represent. But I must say
that I think his description of the way the accused person who is convicted deals
with his contrition in evidence is a bit coloured. ‘He grunts out a few words of
contrition’. Well it is true that many of the people who roll through the criminal
courts do not have the same eloquence that Mr Bartley has. That is why a
particular profession has to be established so that we can make speeches for
accused persons, but I think that the terminology ‘grunts out a few words of
contrition’ is a bit rough. And indeed accused persons are often better dressed
in court than they were on the night of the alleged offence—but then again, so
is the victim.
In terms of the penalties he said “After a few words of contrition are
grunted out the next question is ‘How about a bond?’ ”. Well, if he looks at the
sentencing for sexual assault, he will see that it is not the common pattern to
get a bond for sexual assault. The fact is most convicted persons get sent to
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gaol. Most people who are charged get convicted, most people plead g
uilty, and
do not put the victim through the trauma of trial and the giving of ev
idence.
It is wrong to put forward, in the interests of law reform, vi
ews which are
excessively emotional, based upon the wrong theory that most rapi
sts are
escaping. The facts are that most who come before the court plead g
uilty, and
most of those who plead ‘not guilty’ get convicted, despite the fact th
at they
utilise the procedural mechanisms attacked by Glenn Bartley and by oth
ers: i.e.
the dock statement or the unsworn statement. The fact is that despite all
the
pains and traumas of being the victim of a sexual assault, one t
hing that happens
is that at the end of it, you do not go to gaol, whereas the fellow wh
o is charged
with the offence has that risk. There is a presumption of innocence, i
t is a very
important presumption. And another right which the accused
person has is the
right to stand up in court and make an unsworn statement. Mr Bart
ley is out
of date in saying that that statement permits him to impugn the vi
ctim. It is
out of date in this sense—he is limited now under the amendments
of 1981 in
the sense that he cannot impugn her sexual background. He cannot at
tack from
the dock without fear of recrimination, he cannot attack her sex
ual reputation,
he cannot say she has been sleeping around with Tom, Dick
and Harry. All
those outmoded techniques of defence which were addressed
in the reforms of
1981 are no longer available to him. He can of course stand up and say “I
didn’t
do it”. He can say “She consented” and he can say that she wa
s drunk, or there
were other reasons he can think of why she was telling lies. He doe
s all those
things. The jury considers it, and normally they convict him anyway.
I respect
the attitude of those who at this seminar represent various wom
ens’ groups, and
there are many, obviously, who have that sort of particular int
erest as I have—
the interest basically of representing criminally accused people.
The last seven or eight years in this State have seen a concerted, rationa
l
effort on the part of many interest groups to come to grips with
these problems
and to develop proper law reforms. I hope that the issues rais
ed in these
Proceedings will be taken up. I am much persuaded to the view
that the notion
of video taping a statement of the child victim of an assault and using
that as
prima facie evidence in chief. I think that that is a very attractive
notion.
Ultimately I think the child or the adult has to be confronted in c
ourt, has to
be subjected to cross-examination, but as to children I see cons
iderable merit
in the idea—subject to the point that Maggie Smythe makes: that ther
e is the
difficulty that ﬁrst of all the child may not tell the whole story and
the child’s
evidence may thereupon later be criticised in court for not having repr
esented
the whole story. Maybe the way around that is just to make that
an option that
is available to the prosecution—to have the video tape done at
the beginning
under conditions where not only the child is seen in camera range, but
also
anybody else in the room who is with the child. The entire conversation
would
be video taped so that any questions that are asked of the chil
d are recorded
and are there for the jury to look at eventually. If it turns out subsequent
ly that
that encompasses substantially the child’s evidence in chief, then t
he prosecution
could use that. It would be a fairly intimidating thing for any defen
ce counsel
to see such a video tape, because you know that if the child ‘gets the e
vidence
out’ in court, by and large your client is going to be convicted. One of the g
reat
stumbling blocks, of course, is that the child often cannot ‘get the
evidence out’,
cannot confront the intimidating atmosphere, and the prosecution just fai
ls at
the outset—the defence counsel makes a submission that there is no cas
e to
answer, and he asks for a directed verdict of not guilty and he gets it. So
that
approach, if it were optional to the prosecution would not be perf
ect but I think
would be an improvementover current procedures.
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However, I take the view that that evidence having been put before the
jury, the child will ulitmately have to be available for cross-examination on it,
subject to the very much more sensitive atmosphere these days. Despite
criticisms, things are in fact much more sensitive now in terms of cross-
examination than they were ten or twenty years ago. The judges certainly, and
many magistrates, are sensitive to the notion that child victims should not be
bullied.
Helen L 'Orange
First of all I would like to say that I do consider the comments made by
Mr Bartley as being very important and I will ensure that the matters that he
has raised are taken into account in the forthcoming review.
I think that the points made about the process still being traumatic for
victims appearing as witnesses are generally valid but I would say that the
Sexual Assault Committee and the Child Protection Council have been making
strenuous efforts through community education and through the production of
booklets such as Going to Court to educate victims and to assist them in
understanding the process and their rights to resources.
It is not my experience that victims lose contact with their support person
at the trial stage and I would like to talk to you later about examples of that.
The New South Wales Government has put a lot of money into the provision
of services for victims of sexual assault, both adults and children. The law
provides for the presence of a child’s support person in court even when the
court is closed. There has been a vast improvement in support for victims
during the court processes in the past few years.
. In our paper on p. 37 we did indicate that we felt that there certainly needs
to be more careful regulation of the type of comments made in the unsworn
statement. In other parts of the paper we talked about further clariﬁcation of
the s. 409 (B) exceptions which takes up matters that concern you. I think, too,
the problem of eliminating repressive attitudes to womens’ sexuality through
perhaps an extra 5. 409 (B) provision, and, of course, through action in society
at large is a factor in .the sorts of experiences that victims are still having in
court cases.
I am very disturbed to hear that from your experience victims still think
the whole process stinks. I had hoped that the improvement to date would have
made it less traumatic, but I acknowledged that there is a way to go.
Jenny Earle, Executive Oﬂicer of the Sexual Assault Committee
I just wanted to say one or two things both as Executive Ofﬁcer of the
Sexual Assault Committee and more particularly as a member of the Services
for Victims of Crime Task Force which reported last month, because that
Report has not been mentioned. It did take up a lot of the issues that have not
been raised, particularly about improving and speeding up the courts procedures
for victims and the importance of keeping victims informed. I wanted to make
sure that everyone here was aware of the existence of that Report and its
availability from the Department of the Attorney-General. The Attorney-
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General is very keen to have a response from the wider community to the
recommendations made in that Report so I would urge people to obtain it if
they are interested in following it up.
That Report was perhaps the only Report produced in New South Wales
that recommended the abolition of the unsworn statement. The Report is
obviously advocating on behalf of victims of all crimes but it does have focus,
as the result of efforts of some of the members of that Task Force, on the needs
of sexual assault and domestic violence victims and it was through that concern
that the recommendation for the abolition of the unsworn statement was made.
I think the issue of publicity and the effect that that has on victims should
be mentioned. It is something that the Sexual Assault Committee is taking up
but we need to be aware of the effect that adverse publicity about sexual assault
trials has on the willingness of victims to report in the first place. There should
be greater sensitivity on the part of prosecutors, magistrates, and judges to the
importance of respecting the, privacy of sexual assault victims including
willingness to close the courts and to make orders suppressing the publication
of evidence when necessary. In the case of prosecutors we are talking about a
sensitivity to the availabiltiy of those orders and willingness to consult with
victims as to whether or not they want such orders made.
And finally I just want to point out that there has been some talk about
the gender of victims of these crimes but very little mention of the gender of
the offenders nearly all of whom, of course, are men.
Bronwyn Cosgros'e, Law Student.
I am ignorant of what has been happening in Australia the last eight years
because I lived in the United States but I cannot let go unchecked the remark
made by Dr Woods.
I wish to correct something which I think arises from a gross insensitivity
which he displayed and which strengthens the points made by the previous
Barrister who has defended rape victims.
I am referring to his comment that the victim does not face the possibility
of a prison term, and his juxtaposition of the word ‘victim’ so close to the word
‘goal’ was so blatant. I am sure that people here are aware that they, the victims,
are already condemned to a prison in their own mind. I cannot imagine that
there are many people here who do not understand what I mean when I say
this, but I know that in the community there are those who cannot imagine the
prison that somebody lives in when they know that there are people who have
much greater strength than they have, or who, whether they feel permitted by
society or not, can choose to subject them to a humiliation which still is
considered by most people a normal act, when in fact it is a violation. For you
to imagine this violation you have to imagine something out of ‘Deliverance’
where an offensive male subjects you to great humiliation and fear for your own
life, but it is greater than that because there is a fear accompanied by the rape
of women which men who are raped cannot have—namely of pregnancy. You
may dismiss that because for some women abortion is a simple remedy, and
men who dismiss that lightly are again ignorant of something that is very
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profound. Having talked with many women, and being part of a women’s group
in the United States, I know that even in the case of a rape if a women is
pregnant an abortion is no easy solution.
I understand you speak out of interest for men who may be falsely accused
and that for them it is a nightmare but let me assure you that remarks like yours
do not give people faith that, in fact, we are making huge steps forward.
H. F. Parnell, QC.
I am a Barrister having more than 30 years experience. Many of you would
not have such experience. I have done nearly 20 years for the Crown and nearly
20 years for the defence so I think I am qualified to make a few pertinent
remarks.
My trepidation in speaking is linked to the fact that in 1978 when I was
the Senior Public Defender for this State certain womens’ groups organised a
very big seminar at the Wentworth Hotel. They were looking for somebody who
was said to know something about the criminal law and as Senior Public
Defender I was approached. I understand that Vin Wallace, Q.C., who was the
Senior Crown Prosecutor was also approached. When I was told that he had
been approached I suggested that it would be more appropriate that he appear
rather than me and they said: “Oh no, we do not think so”. If ever a person
was trapped I was on that occasion. That is one reason I am having something
to say here, because the interesting thing is that as far as I am concerned, this
audience has displayed an equanimity, a sensibility, and an awareness that really
was not in evidence on that other occasion. All I was asked to do, and you will
forgive me for reminiscing, was to put the law as it was. There were various
people there who were putting the proposition of course that the 1978
amendments should come into force. There were some very prominent women
speakers but I no sooner stood up and put the law when I was told to sit down
in very unseemly terms. I was told by one woman, who jumped to her feet (and
I know you will excuse me for saying this but I regard it very seriously) and
said 'that I was a ‘sexist, racist, animal bastard.’ All I was doing was putting the
law because I had been asked to do so on that occasion.
This is a very, very serious subject. There is no question about that. It is
an emotive subject. You young people are to be commended for the interest
that you take in it. I know that womens’ groups round the world have found
this particular topic a source of great trouble and a source of great interest and
properly so, but there is a lot of nonsense talked about the crime of rape, and
there are a lot of opinions which are quite inconsistent.
I note here today, and I am not being critical, but just putting to you an
overview, that some of the distinguished speakers on the platform are talking
about the crime of rape. In 1978 if one had dared to mention the word ‘rape’
one would not only have been abused but probably would have been ejected
from that particular seminar. ‘Sexual assault’ was the proper term.
I recently heard on the radio a wellspoken lady making a complaint that
the trouble with the modern view with regard to rape, and she used the word
rape, was that too many people were talking about physical violence. They had
forgotten that rape was a sexual oﬂence. That was a matter, of course, that was
raised by way of complaint with considerable heat in 1978.
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I mention these matters because it illustrates that we have to be careful in
the attitudes that we display in regard to this subject.
There can be no question, as I put in 1978, that the large majority of
people who are charged with rape are convicted of rape. I am not speaking from
lack of experience but I am speaking from the hard solid position of one who
has appeared in many of these cases. 1 was shouted down on that occasion: that
was nonsense; that was piﬁle; that the people walked out of court in great
' numbers; it was not the truth. The percentage of convictions then was something
of the order of 80%.
The changes that have been made, I think with reﬂection, are good changes.
One melldws with time, however what I suggested in 1978 has come to pass,
namely, that if you introduce three categories of rape people will plead guilty
to category 3. That is precisely what has happened and in numerous cases it
has meant that the penalty of seven years is much less than people would have
received previously.
There is a lot of nonsense talked about the sentences that have been handed
out for rape over the years. You may not realise that there are a number of
people in gaol still serving sentences from years gone by. They are in the order
of 18 to 20 years and it is a little difﬁcult. to take when people think everybody
gets a bond or a comparativley minor sentence. I am not saying those people
did not deserve it. They were diabolical cases.
For instance, in 1961 or thereabouts when I was on the Crown side there
were half a dozen young men charged with a terrible rape case called the
‘Wetherill Park Rape Case’. It had some similarities to the infamous ‘Mount
Rennie case’ of the 19205. Those young men who were involved deserved little
sympathy. It was a diabolical case and with one exception they were sentenced
to life imprisonment. Most of them were only 18 years of age and some of them
had no convictions at all. I will always remember one young man who had been
a booking clerk at Fairﬁeld railway station. He had no convictions at all and
he was sentenced to life as was his brother.
I know that the Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research have distributed
a paper today about punishment. 1 was recently reading Tony Vinson’s book,
Wilfu/ Obstruction, which gives an overview of the situation in prisons in this
State and he pointed out, amongst other things, that in Holland in 1980 there
were no people currently serving a sentence in excess of three years for rape.
Be that as it may, can I just say objectively arising from what has been
said at'this seminar that I would like to support the proposition, it is an old
old Shibboleth I know, that the dock statement should not be abandoned. It
would be wrong to revise the law and introduce evidence on oath by accused
persons only in cases of sexual crime and still retain the dock statement for
other offences.
I also say that my views have changed over the years but slightly with
regard to the ordeal that is suffered by victims. Not that I ever had any doubt
that victims did suffer a considerable ordeal in the witness box. I think the
power of cross-examination can be overdone on occasions. We do know that
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in a period in the 19605 and ’705 certain counsel seemed to be carried away
with their own importance and some of the attacks that were made on victims
in my view were unnecessary. No doubt they were in accordance with
instructions, but they certainly should have been tempered with a lot more
discretion than they were. I think that position has changed and changed
considerably, and we are indebted to those who'framed the 1978 and 1981
amendments, including Dr Woods who was one of the architects of the 1981
amendments. You cannot have a position where the accused cannot get a fair
trial, but those amendments have restricted some of the undesirable cross
examination. I commend that, but I would not be in favour of any further
extensions amounting to a denial of the rights of the accused.
In conclusion can I say after a lot of experience in criminal courts, a period
in excess of 30 years is a long time, I do not remember any case in which I
have appeared either for the Crown or the defence where it could be truthfully
said that responsible counsel have exceeded the barriers of propriety in dealing
with children and I am speaking of small children. A large number of the
offenders charged with sex offences against children have pleaded guilty over
the years and continue to plead guilty. It is a terrible thing for a child. There
is no question about that. It is a sad thing. I think that restriction on the number
of appearances by such children by any process that can be done with care, with
accuracy, with fairness, should be pursued. Paul Byrne’s idea of tape recording
the statement of complaint is an excellent idea in these cases.
AnmRiseley, Senior Law Reform Ofﬁcer, Australian Law Reform Commission.
I want to correct a conclusion that was drawn by the Director of the
Women’s Unit, Ms Helen L’Orange, in her paper on the results of the Bureau
of Crime Statistics and Research’s monitoring of the effects of the 1981
amending legislation on sexual assault. Ms L’Orange’s paper concludes that the
ﬁndings of the Bureau study demonstrate an increase in convictions, an increase
in guilty pleas and a decrease in acquittals under the Crimes (Sexual Assault)
Amendment Act, 1981 as compared to the Crimes Act, 1900. On its face this is
true. But once disaggregate the Bureau’s data according to the three categories
of sexual assault and the picture is quite different ‘
I refer to an issue of the Law' Reform Commission’s Journal Reform in
which there was a review of the Bureau’s second interim Report. The conclusion
drawn by the reviewer of that Report was that as between rape, that is the pre-
1981 common law offence and its statutory replacement under s. 61 (d), has
been no signiﬁcant change in the levels of pre-trial lapsing in relation to s. 61
(d) offence. There has been no signiﬁcant change in the not guilty pleas, and no
signiﬁcant change in relation to acquittals. In relation to conviction rates for s.
61 (d) the measure the Bureau used was the conviction rate for other serious
crimes. For example, murder trials in 1983 in New South Wales produced a
conviction rate of 83.3%. In relation to s. 61 (d) offences however, if you allow
for the convictions for lesser offences then under s. 61 ((1) you have got a real
conviction rate of 68.8%. It is a signiﬁcant result. In my opinion the data in
the body of the Bureau’s second interim Report has made the work of the
Bureau very worthwhile. The conclusion in that Report belies the strong
indicationsin that data that there has, in fact, been no change for what we used
to call rape in relation to things like pre-trial lapsing, not guilty pleas, acquittals,
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and convictions. That is a very signiﬁcant result and you will not ﬁnd it
expressed in the chapter headed “Conclusions” in the Bureau’s report no more
than Ms L’Orange has expressed it here today on page 27 of her paper which
has probably no doubt been directly drawn from the “Conclusions” chapter of
the Second Report. The point was made as it-is made in the Bureau’s report
and also by Helen L’Orange that the most commonly charged offences under
the new amendments is s. 61 (d). The Bureau’s second Report shows, at least
when carefully read. that the problem site is s. 61 ((1). Helen L’Orange has
pointed out that there is Still work to be done in this area. I agree, but I add
that we must start from the truth and from there’ we can progress.
Dr Sandra Eggcr
1 am not sure that 1 fully understood the technical argument that you
are
making. The problem is that in any evaluation study of this nature th
e universe
of offences has changed in several respects. For example. you are
dealing with
an expanded deﬁnition of sexual intercourse so that previously many offen
ces
which may have been charged under the law of indecent assault fo
r example.
or under the relevant sections of the Crimes Act which cover
homosexual
offences. are now capable of being charged under the sexual assault
categories
1 to 3. You are dealing with a totally different universe so compa
risons are a
little bit difficult. You have to say "Well, notwithstanding that I wil
l take the
old universe and the new universe as the deﬁning populations”. 1 think
your
argument is that if you take category 1 offences and the category 2 of
fences out
of the new law you are able to compare category 3 and rap
e. The problem is
then how do you take offences which would now be classiﬁed as c
ategory 1 or
2 out of the old law to make that comparison yalid'.’
Ann Rise/er
I am relying on the data that was in the body of the Bureau’s Second
Report. I would remind you that the premises that you are drawi
ng are relied
on in Helen L’Orange’s paper and in the concluding chapter of the S
econd
Report. If you pursue that line of reasoning you equally invite dis
credit on the
Bureau’s and Ms L’Orange’s conclusion.
Dr Sandra Eggcr
Yes. It is very technical. 1 would like to sit down with you at some stage
and run through the arguments. 1 think we would probably lose every
one now.
and perhaps bore everyone to tears but I do think it is an interesting p
oint and
I would like to explore it.* -
Chairman
11 is commonly said that there are now three categories of s
exual
intercourse without consent: categories 1. 2. and 3. That in fact is n
ot what the
legislation provides. There is only one offence of sexual intercourse
without
consent and that is category 3. Categories 1, and 2 are thre
ats, aggravated
circumstances associated with intended sexual intercourse co
nsent, but neither
category 1. nor category 2 requires an act of sexual intercour
se. in order to
constitute the offence. They are aggravating antecedent offences which ma
y be
‘ see Appendix on p. 88 for a more detailed rcp|y from Dr Eggcr.
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committed in association with the only statutory offence of sexual intercourse
without consent—that-‘Tis the category 3. That is not commonly appreciated.
There is often talk of three categories of seriousness of sexual intercourse
without consent but that is quite in the teeth of what the legislation provides,
and that, of course, is another factor which can tend to cloud statistical debate.
That needs to be kept very much clearly in mind.
Charles Goldberg, Solicitor
Let me preface my remarks by indicating that my experience has normally
been appearing on behalf of persons charged with offences and I cannot say
much to Mr Bartley except to indicate that all of us here would no doubt have
sympathy with any victim ofa sexual assault.
Having said that I am astounded at the suggestion that a victim should be
party to determining what course of action should be adopted by courts or by
the prosecution in relation to carrying out the court process in respect of any
person who is charged with a criminal offence, because it goes without saying
that the ordinary lay person who woiild not have the experience to understand
the signiﬁcance ofthe evidence that would be read by the prosecution. In those
circumstances it would mean that a prosecutor was handing over his function,
the job that he is being paid to do, to the person who has complained of an
offence being perpetrated on him or her. That would be unconscionable and
for that very reason any such victims should not be party to any determination
whether it be by plea bargaining or by application made by counsel or solicitor
on behalf of the person who has been brought before the court.
I would also like to put a question to Constable Nixon in relation to
Detective Sergeant Thornthwaite’s paper. I quibble with the concept on page
63 of the statement:
It is a world wide fact that children do not tell lies in relation
to sexual abuse that has been committed upon them by a person in
authority.
I would like to know where you get some form of authority to make such
a statement which would suggest that at all times any child who makes a
complaint should be taken as being a person furnishing the Gospel truth—that
no' query should be put in relation to such a complaint? I think most of us who
have had any experience in court would appreciate the number oftimes where
the young (and when I say young children‘I include those who are in the puberty
stages or just post puberty) will frequently make complaints in respect of persons
who are quite close to them for the very reason that the parent or uncle or friend
has refused to furnish them with something that they require or want. Perhaps
you could indicate, if you are competent to do so, where Sergeant Thornthwaite
got the material to make such a statement.
In relation to the matters raised by Mr Bartley about sympathy for the
victim, I am very conscious of the number of times that I have seen persons
who have made complaint subsequently go to press, particularly where a person
who has been charged has been acquitted, using the newspaper as a means to
ventilate their grievance. In those circumstances it seems strange to hear from
certain people who have spoken at this seminar that with the stigma that used
 
 
 
87
to be attached to the old charge of rape before the 1981 amendment people are
still keen to come before the papers. It probably also reinforces my suggestion
in relation to the parties who, for want of a better term, are described as the
‘victims‘, having any determination or role in the decision as to what sort of
plea might be taken.
In relation to Mr Purnell’s statement as to the changes 1 might reiterate
that it has indeed been quite open and quite noticeable that counsel and
solicitors today do not tend to attack young children. The very reason is
that
you are not going to get anywhere if you do. apart from the feelings that every
person who appears in court just does not do it.
Might I suggest that when a person is charged that the statements be
furnished in a period of not less than seven days (in respect of sexual offences
relating to young children) because obviously ifa sexual charge is being laid in
respect of a young person then that means that the statement should be
available. Secondly, might it not be possible, and I know this is a problem for
administration (Mr Byrne might assist here) to ensure that all such charges are
brought before the court and early dates be tnade for the hearing. What I am
suggesting is expedition of all sexual assault matters. Finally might I also suggest
that in relation to matters that come before the higher courts (Dr Oates was
not conscious that he was talking about committal proceedings in relation to
sexual cases), that those matters again be expedited. If that was done there is
no doubt that the trauma that is envisaged or that is visited upon any victims
might be mitigated or lessened.
Constable Christine Nixon
I think that Detective Sergeant Thornthwaite’s statement is very well
supported, but perhaps for emphasis he has chosen to say all. Eviden
ce has
come from studies in the Henry. Kemp Centre in Denver, for
instance, in 98%
of the cases where children claim these issues have later found
to be true. I
certainly, in other forums, have advocated the fact that children
in the
overwhelming majority of cases do not lie, and Detective Sergeant Thornthw
aite
has made the point here for emphasis. For that minimal percenta
ge where they
do lie, the trauma and harm done to those children on that basi
s of a minimal
unsubstantiatedpercentage is a problem that has to be overcome
, and to take
it up as you have is an example of exactly the problem we have. Very
few people
want to look at the statistics and look at the facts that in the ov
erwhelming
majority children do not lie when they report these incidents.
Chairman
I should like to acknowledge the leadership that we have had
from the
paper writers this evening. They presented different points
of view. The
discussion then seemed to pass over to members of the Bar. It
is not without
interest that there is now a new class of professional representa
tive, that is to
say the lawyer, who is concerned with victims. I think that
we must all recognize
that the community is swinging towards a realization of the plight o
f the victim.
I do not for a moment lose sight of the fact that the criminal
justice system
must operate with full fairness to the accused person, but
for so long in the
past the victim has been little more than a witness. I think it is
a heartening
trend to see the developing community awareness of the victim’s
position not
just in the area of sex offences but across the whole spectrum of cri
me.
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APPENDIX
Dr Sandra Egger
The conclusions drawn by Ms. Riseley in the discussion period and by the
author of an article in the Australian'Law Reform Commission’s Journal,
Reform (July 1986, No. 43, p. 142) are incorrect.
It is asserted that s. 61D of the Crimes (Sexual Assault) Amendment Act,
1981 is the ‘statutory replacement’ for rape (s. 63 of the Crimes Act, 1900) and
that when these two sections are compared there are “no signiﬁcant change(s)
in the levels of pre-trial lapsing, not guilty pleas, acquittals’ and ‘convictions’.
Firstly the comparison is not the ‘right’ or even the most appropriate
comparison to make in assessing the changes associated with the introduction
of the new law. Section 61D is not the statutory replacement for rape. The
former offence of rape include offences now classiﬁed under s. 613, 5. 61C and
s. 610. The differences between rape and s. 610 are as great as the similarities.
The category rape is comprised of offences which involve actual penis-vagina
penetration and includes cases where the penetration is accompanied by
grievous bodily harm (or the threat) or actual bodily harm (or the threat with
a weapon). The category of s. 610 is comprised of offences which involve penis-
v’aigina penetration, anal intercourse, fellatio, cunnilingus, the insertion of
objects or parts of the body into the anus or vagina, or the continuation of
sexual intercourse and does not include cases where bodily harm (grievous or
actual) is inﬂicted or threatened. The latter are usually charged under s. 613 or
5. 61C although s. 610 may be charged as well (R v Smith, [1982] NS. W. Law
Reports, 569). '
Section 610 and rape represent different but overlapping sets of acts. The
extent of overlap cannot be ascertained from the Bureau Report but it may be
quite small given that only 54.9% of the total offence population studied under
the 1981 amendments was charged under s. 61D and only 50.5% of this total
population of cases involved penis-vagina penetration. .
Secondly, even if the comparisons are made according to Ms. Riseley’s
criteria it is not correct to say that ‘there has in fact been no change’. Table 1
compares the ‘old’ law and the ‘new’ law.
 
TABLE 1
total total
population: population:
rape 3' 61D previous [98!
law amendments
N % N % N % N %
Lapsing before Trial 44 28.2 26 20.8 49 25.3 42 18.4
Plea of not guilty 69 71.1 46 51.7 78 53.8 8| 43.5
Conviction 58 59.8 69 74.2 102 70.3 154 82.8
Percentage of not guilty pleas
acquitted 39 56.6 24 52.2 43 55.l 33 40.7 
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Section 610 differs from rape in the percentage of cases lapsing before trial
(20.8% vs 28.2%), not guilty pleas (51.7% vs 71.1%), acquittals (52.2% vs 56.6%),
and convictions (74.2% vs 59.8%).
Thirdly, it is claimed that these differences are not ‘signiﬁcant’. Such a
conclusion is unwarranted given that no tests of statistical signiﬁcance were
reported by either the Bureau or Ms. Riseley, and incorrect. A series of chi-
square analyses on each of these variables reveals the following—
1. The difference between s. 61D and rape in the proportion of cases
lapsing before trial was not signiﬁcant (X2 = 1.66 N.S.),.
2. The difference between s. 61D and rape in the propoution of cases
pleading guilty was signiﬁcant (X2 = 6.64, p < 0.01).
3. The difference between s. 610 and rape in the proportion of cases
convicted was signiﬁcant (X2 = 3.875 p < 0.05).
4. The difference between s. 61D and rape in the proportion of cases
acquitted where a plea of guilty was entered was not signiﬁcant
(X2.= 0.21 N.S..)
Thus, there were signiﬁcantly more guilty pleas entered and signiﬁcantly
more convictions under s. 61D than under rape.
1f the intention in making these assertions was simply to point out that
even under the new law, the prosecution of sexual assault offences is more
(difﬁcult where there is no evidence of actual or threatened violence then it
should be expressed in these terms. The argument is not further advanced by
claims that only certain comparisons are ‘right’ and represent the ‘truth’.
Finally, the proper test of the changes brought about by the amendments
is the comparison between rape (and attempt rape) under the old law, and
between s. 618, 5. 61C and s. 61 (and attempts) under the 1981 amendments,
‘asreported by the Bureau. Research of this nature cannot remove the inﬂuence
exerted by the legal system in analyzing, constructing and classifying certain acts
as criminal offences.
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